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I.  INTRODUCTION
One hears the word “federalism” with some frequency these days.  The 
debates over medical marijuana, capital punishment, abortion, assisted suicide, 
capital punishment, school financing, and even environmental policy, all have 
vital federalism dimensions.  And as political conservatives have come 
increasingly to dominate the federal government, conservatives and liberals alike 
have reconsidered their commitments to federalism.  On these and other issues, 
the word “federalism” has transformed from a tired shibboleth for political 
conservatism into a more interesting, if complex, focus for conversation and 
debate.
The debate continues, but lawyers, academics, and concerned citizens who 
seek guidance on federalism issues in the pages of the United States Reports will 
not find a consistent theory of federalism within.  The United States Supreme 
Court’s fractured federalism opinions provide invariably Byzantine, frequently 
contradictory, and generally unhelpful advice.  It is tempting to adapt Lord 
Macaulay’s dim view of the United States Constitution to the Supreme Court’s 
federalism opinions:  “all sail and no anchor.”3
We share the frustrations of those who search for a new paradigm.  In light 
of the enormous size and scope of the federalism question, we feel that the best 
way to move the conversation forward—the best way really to explore the secret 
workings of American federalism—is to break out of foreordained conceptual 
categories.  What is called for is a free-wheeling, broad ranging, and altogether 
unreserved dialectic.  Accordingly, we offer the reader the following exchange as 
a contribution to the ongoing scholarly dialogue on federalism.4
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2II.  PHANTOM FEDERALISM?:  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Steve,
Many commentators consider the Supreme Court’s recent cases construing 
the Commerce Clause, especially United States v. Lopez and United States v. 
Morrison,5 to be the central axis of developing federalism jurisprudence.6 I 
generally think this attitude is wrong.  Not only are the origins of federalism 
deeply historic, running back to the very earliest decisions of the Supreme Court, 
but if there are any strong doctrines of federalism in the United States Reports 
they descend from the intergovernmental immunities7 and comity/abstention8
decisions of the 1970s.  
I think that a more useful approach is to ask to what extent the Supreme 
Court’s decisions reflect, or should reflect, various possible views regarding the 
relationship of the federal and State governments.  The two views I want to 
examine are (1) the independent State model and (2) the enumerated -power 
model. Model (1), the independent State model, focuses on areas of regulation —
that is, subjects of State and federal policy.  It would protect the independence of 
the State governments by using judicial review protect to defeat assertions of 
federal power in certain policy areas, which would then be left entirely to the 
States.  It works exactly like individual rights:  every federal power is one stick in 
a bundle of sticks, and the independent State model uses the Supreme Court as  a 
knife to cut through them.  Model (2), the enumeration model, focuses on powers 
rather than policies.  It would treat federalism interests as already reflected in the 
enumeration of federal powers in the Constitution.  According to this model, the 
assertion of federalism interests in a Commerce Clause case (indeed in any case) 
is profoundly question-begging.  Surely if “we, the people” delegated a power to 
5 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); Gonzales v. Raich, 
125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6 See, e.g., Jesse Choper and John Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause After Morrison, 25 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 843 (Fall 2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the uses and Limits of 
Law:  Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998); Bradford R. Clark, Translating 
Federalism:  A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161 (1998); Ann Althouse, 
Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793 (1996); Stephen 
Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 795 (1996).
7 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
8 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
3the federal government through the act of ratification,9 then it’s irrelevant whether 
the Supreme Court, or anyone else, thinks the delegation was hasty or unwise.
Model (1) is pretty radical.  While the Supreme Court briefly flirted with it 
National League of Cities v. Usery,10 model (2) generally predominates, as it 
should.  When asked whether Congress can do something, lawyers ought to the 
Constitution, oughtn’t they?
Truly, 
R.B.
Professor Bezanson, 
Obviously so, but nevertheless Lopez and Morrison stirred quite the 
controversy about federalism.11  It’s not clear to me, however, that the narrow 
holdings of Lopez and Morrison justified the tumult.  In Lopez, the Supreme 
Court struck down a Gun Free School Zones Act provision that criminalized 
knowing possession of a firearm near a school building.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court argued that carrying a handgun in or near a 
school is neither commercial nor economic, “however broadly one might define
those terms.”12 A debatable proposition, to be sure, but I’m inclined to agree.
Whatever the words “Commerce … among the several States” may mean, they do 
not directly refer to intraState weapons possession.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
allowed that the government might have prevailed if the statute were a necessary, 
“essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,” but the provision at 
issue in Lopez plainly was not.13 The basic claim isn’t too radical.  Regardless 
whether Lopez is right, the Court speaks in the language of your model (2) above:  
“we, the people” did not delegate to Congress the power to punish simple 
weapons possession, unless the government proves that a specific act of 
possession, in a specific case, is connected to interState commerce—as when a 
statute enumerates interState travel or use of a weapon that has traveled in 
interState commerce as an element of a criminal offense.14
A few years later, in Morrison, the Supreme Court struck down a 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act.  The provision created a federal 
civil damages action for victims of violent conduct that is motivated by the 
victim’s gender.  The holding necessarily sweeps somewhat more broadly than 
Lopez because Congress explicitly made explicitly found that when considered in 
9 See U.S. CONST. Art. VII (“The Ratifications of the Conventions of nine States, shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same”).
10 Usery, 426 U.S. at 833.
11 See, e.g., the authorities cited in note 6, supra.
12 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
13 Id.; see also Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
14 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (discussing the absence of a jurisdictional element in the Gun Free 
School Zones Act provision at issue).
4the aggregate, violence against women that is motivated by the victim’s gender 
seriously affects interState commerce ,15 findings that the Court criticized and 
rejected.16
Admittedly, the Chief Justice strays into your independent States model.  
He cited Lopez and discussed worries that Congress could decide for itself that 
aggregate effects were present and regulate “family law and other areas of 
traditional State regulation” based on “the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, 
and childrearing on the national economy.”17 But the Chief Justice’s opinion 
pulls itself back from the brink of model (1) by establishing a fairly clear rule:  he 
explicitly “reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, 
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on 
interState commerce.”18 Why?  The majority saw the core question as one of 
delegation.  The people delegated limited powers to Congress.  The ratifying 
population almost certainly did not mean to delegate “police power” to a distant 
federal legislature or to vitiate the “distinction between what is truly national and 
what is truly local.”19 Independent States reasoning, I suppose.  But the rule itself 
isn’t specifically tied to the States as States, and so it  fits more nearly with your 
enumerated powers model.  The federalism rhetoric isn’t necessary for or relevant 
to the result.
So if this is a federalism revolution, it is a tame one indeed—though I 
worry that we’ve reached that conclusion by defining federalism so that almost no 
one is in favor of it.  Loose talk of “police power” is disturbing, but very few 
federal statutes rest solely on aggregate economic effects analysis.  Let me 
suggest something slightly different.  Commerce Clause law before Lopez was 
hardly unambiguous.  I think Eric Claeys’s explanation of the New Deal cases is a 
good one.  He argues that post-New Deal rational basis review was really a
compromise between progressive reformers (who believed in unlimited 
congressional power) and the Supreme Court (which the public must perceive to 
be principled).20  Professor Claeys describes the New Deal-era Supreme Court’s 
“key innovation” as the modification of the substantial effects test in the NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel21 case:  that case, he argues, “reversed the basic 
orientation of pre-1937 doctrine by reversing the direction of the ‘effects’ test.  
15 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
16 Id.
17 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-616 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-79 (Kennedy, J, 
concurring)).
18 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
19 Id., 529 U.S. at 617-18 (citing NLRB  v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
20
 Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause:  Federalism in Progressive Political Theory and 
the Commerce Clause after Lopez Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 403, 429-42 
(December 2002).
21 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5Roughly speaking, from Gibbons to the New Deal, the ‘effects’ test tried to 
maintain a principled line between interState commerce and local act ivities” by 
permitting Congress to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause to regulate intraState activity “only after it was [already] clear 
the law’s primary effect was to regulate interState commerce.”22  The new 
substantial effects test, by contrast, permitted Congress to regulate nearly any 
activity, but “[b]ecause the test continued to distinguish between interState
commerce and local activities” in principle, “it preserved the idea that the 
Commerce Clause was one of several limited and enumerated powers.”23  I’m less 
cynical than Professor Claeys, but plainly Lopez and Morrison disambiguate the 
New Deal settlement that he aptly describes.  
The Supreme Court’s holdings in Lopez and Morrison may destabilize 
consensus in the legal community, but they do not, without more, inject radical 
extratextual federalism principles into constitutional law.  I’m not conceding that 
the decisions are correct (far from it), but it’s clear to me that Lopez and Morrison
don’t disturb the core Commerce Clause precedents.  The respondents in 
Gonzales v. Raich24 relied on Lopez and Morrison to ask the Supreme Court to 
hold that the Controlled Substance Act’s global criminal prohibition against 
marijuana was invalid as applied to intraState, medical use  of marijuana by 
terminally ill cancer patients.  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens 
quipped that “[i[n their myopic focus, [respondents] overlook the larger context of 
modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases.”25 Lopez
and Morrison involved challenges alleging “that a particular statute or provision 
fell outside Congress’[s] commerce power in its entirety” rather than a challenge 
“ask[ing the Supreme Court] to excise individual applications of a concededly 
valid statutory scheme.”26
As I’ve re-rold it, surely Professor Claeys’s story leaves out many of the 
details.  But I think that it’s generally true.  It seems to me that the New Deal 
Justices left us with what Cass Sunstein has called an “incompletely theorized 
agreement.”27 Rational basis review left Congress with immense power, but 
avoided an official abdication of judicial review.  Lopez, Morrison, and with time, 
Raich, disambiguate the agreement.  The Supreme Court has said, in broad 
22
 Claeys, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. at 429-30 (discussing The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 
U.S. 342 (1914) (Hughes, J.); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 324 (Cardozo, J., 
dissenting); and NLRB v.  Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
23 Id., 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. at 430.
24 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2209.
25 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2209.
26 Id., at 2209.
27
 Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (May 1995) 
(discussing the importance of agreement on conventions without agreement on underlying theory, 
ideology, or philosophy).
6strokes, that we have to live with immense congressional power and that the 
Supreme Court will never abdicate its power of judicial review. 
Sincerely,
S.M.
Steve,
I think we disagree in part.  It sounds like you’re pretty much willing to do 
away with talk of “federalism” and chalk it all up to enumeration.  Hence your 
complaints about Morrison.  I grant that you’re surely right federalism talk need 
not, and perhaps should not, play any direct role in analyzing the Constitution’s 
text, given that any interest in federalism is already reflected in the methodology 
of enumeration.  Our own Iowa City’s Nuclear Weapons Free Zone ordinance,28
for example, should pose no legal obstacle to a federal military installation that 
stores and maintains nuclear weapons, provided that the facility is otherwise 
constitutionally established.29 Federal power trumps State dignity when it 
exists.30
But from a broader perspective your position is too dismissive.  
Federalism is the background for sober enumerated powers analysis.  The 
distributions of decision-making authority in the Constitution are a reflection of a 
government marked by “dual sovereignty,” as the Justice Kennedy has aptly put 
it.31  Think about Iraq today:  a federal government with three separate “States” 
(Kurds, Shitite, and Sunni/Shiite mix in the middle).  Won’t the power of the 
central government there necessarily have to be limited so as to allow governing 
autonomy in the “States” so that religious, cultural, and economic differences can 
continue to be reflected?  In this sense, Iraq is not much different that the original 
28
 Iowa City, IA City Code, Title 6, Ch. 5, §§ 6-5-3 (“Nuclear Weapons Work Prohibited.  No 
person shall knowingly engage in work within the city, the purpose of which is the development, 
production, deployment, launching, maintenance or storage of nuclear weapons or components of 
nuclear weapons”) and 6-5-5 (making violation a “simple misdemeanor or municipal infraction” 
and creating a private civil action in city residents to enforce the provision), available at 
http://66.113.195.234/IA/Iowa%20City/index.htm (last accessed 6 January 2006).
29 U.S. CONST. Art I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To … provide for the common 
Defense ….”), cl. 11 (“… [t]o raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that 
use shall be for a longer Term than two Years”), cl. 12 (“… [t]o provide and maintain a Navy”), 
and cl. 13 (“… [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces”).
30 See Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2213 (“Just as acquiescence to federal regulation cannot expand the 
bounds of the Commerce Clause, [citation omitted], so too State action cannot circumscribe 
Congress’[s] plenary commerce power [citation and footnote omitted]”).
31 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 840 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7American union of disparate colonial interests, where decentralized diversity was 
the political price of military and economic unification.32
At bottom, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lopez and Morrison purport 
to give enumeration some teeth as a true limit.  Why?  Because of the federalism 
roots of the enumeration methodology itself.  Chief Justice Rehnquist was eager, 
and correctly so, to note in Morrison that the framers “[d]epart[ed] from their 
parliamentary past,” and “adopted a written Constitution that further divided 
authority at the federal level so that the Constitution’s provisions would not be 
defined solely by the political branches nor the scope of legislative power limited 
only by public opinion and the Legislature’s self-restraint.”33  Congress is not 
Parliament; it was not meant to have the powers of a unitary government; and any 
constitutional doctrine that gives Congress completely plenary powers (or, what is
really the same, the power to define its powers) is at loggerheads with the primal 
principle of enumerated, and therefore limited, federal power.  My guess is that 
the Justices are trying to enforce limits with a view to, but without explicitly 
incorporating, the States’ interests a nd extratextual federalism principles.
In short, I think that there really is a vague, weak kind of judicial 
federalism at work in these cases.  I gather from what you’ve written that you take 
a dim view of it, but why should you?  If the federalism at work is really as 
demure as I have cast it, why fret about the Supreme Court’s taking a moment to 
reflect on the framers’ emphatic rejection of unitary government and their quite 
deliberate choices to distribute decision-making powers in certain ways and to 
specific levels of government? 
Regards,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
There’s nothing wrong with careful attention to history, but the Supreme 
Court doesn’t have license to restructure the government with substantive 
federalism principles.  I concede that it has to draw lines based on enumeration in 
the text, but it cannot draw them just anywhere.  Conservative talismans like 
“federalism” and “separation of powers” don’t actually appear anywhere within 
the four corners of the Constitution.  A Supreme Court decision that redefines 
32 See generally Akhil R. Amar AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 43-53 (Random House 
2005) (arguing that the central motivations behind the establishment of the Constitution of 1789 
were deeply geopolitical—the need for military and economic unity in the face of potential 
invasion or interference by, and economic competition from, European imperial powers).
33 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616, n7 (citing and quoting, in parenthetical, Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 176 (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those 
limits may not b mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written”)).
8Congress’s powers trifles with democracy, and so it should be grounded in an 
intellectually coherent account of the Constitution’s text and the very real regime 
that it creates.  That said, surely the Morrison majority was right to State that 
every commerce regulation the court had sustained up to up to Lopez regulated 
some activity that was either “economic” in some attenuated sense or that had
substantial effects on interState commerce.34 I think you can articulate a
distinction between raising crops like wheat and marijuana on the one hand 
(economic) and acts of violence on the other (noneconomic), but the ghost of 
Justice Holmes looms large:  given that one can draw a distinction, the relevant 
question is why he or she should draw it.35 I just don’t see anything coherent here.  
It’s all ad hoc.  So even if judicial review isn’t presumptively illegitimate in this 
area, Lopez and Morrison don’t coherently reconstruct Article I, section 8.  Or am 
I asking for too much?
Truly,
S.M.
Steve,
I think you’re beating something of a straw man.  Of course I agree that 
interpreting constitutional language to get at substantive results is illegitimate, 
even when the result in question is some unquestionably relevant abstraction like 
“federalism” or “separation of powers.”  The specific purposes of the framers and 
the ratifying population matter.  But the problem with this vague formulation is 
that exactly nine Justices on the Supreme Court are sure to agree with it.  It verges 
on tautology; it’s not a useful tool for gaining purchase on the Court’s work.  
Perhaps something like the following analysis is more helpful.  The 
Justices, I think, paused to reflect on the original reasons for the enumeration of 
Congress’s powers in the Constitution.  The test we have after Morrison does not 
literally incorporate some formulation like “traditional State concern” as one of its 
elements.36  It this minimal sense, they didn’t use independent State (model (1)) 
concepts of federalism as part of their gloss on Article I. Lopez and Morrison are 
quite noticeably distinct from the now-repudiated Fair Labor Standards Act case, 
Nationa League of Cities v. Usery, and the Eleventh Amendment cases, which use 
independent State concepts in this se nse.37  Rather, the majority opinions in both 
34 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
35 See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1897).
36 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-13 (elaborating four factor test).
37 Usery, 426 U.S. at 845 (“… there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every State
government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an 
affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution 
prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner) (emphasis added); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (“To rest on the words of the [Eleventh] Amendment alone would be to 
engage in the type of ahistorical literalism we have rejected in interpreting the scope of the States' 
9cases refer to or mention them as illustrative of the nature of the federalism 
interests supposedly codified in the original enumeration.38  One can believe that 
Lopez and Morrison are technically wrong without embracing the fairly radical 
idea that mere reference to federalism concerns is illegitimate when those 
concerns are not explicit in the Constitution’s text.  Surely you are not claiming 
that every invocation of extratextual federalism is inappropriate on democracy 
grounds, either historically, as a matter textual principles and purposes, or 
practically.  If you are, then wouldn’t you have to give up any robust reading of 
the Bill of Rights, and any further extension of individual constitutional rights 
claims?  The First Amendment and substantive due process cases are brimming, 
even more so than the federalism cases, with extratextual principles, and the Court 
invokes these principles to upset democratic political outcomes.39
Puzzled,
R.B. 
Professor Bezanson,
I’ll answer your straw man with a dead horse.  Courts aren’t elected, but 
courts don’t need to be elected legitimately to do some things.  Invoking 
extratextual principles to police illegitimate violations of legal rules established to 
protect the natural and human rights of individuals is clearly different than 
invoking extratextual principles to restructure the powers of government.  The 
Constitution is a document of the Eighteenth Century.  Its electric current is the 
rhetoric of individual rights and policing the abuse of government power.40  The 
Bill of Rights records and memorializes these rights as strong prohibitions on 
government conduct.  It seems impossible for a legal document to capture the full 
meaning of the rights the Constitution is supposed to protect. Thus, the Supreme 
Court must invoke extratextual principles.  Those invoked by Justice Chase in 
sovereign immunity since the discredited decision in Chisholm [v. Georgia]” (citing Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68, 69 (1996).  See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997) (holding that Conrgess may not by statute require State executive agencies to implement 
federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not by 
statute require State legislatures to implement federal law by enacting legislation).
38
 We mean to invoke something like the use/mention distinction that is popular in analytic 
philosophy.  Simon Blackburn, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 387 (Oxford 1996) 
(“use/mention distinction  The distinction between using a word, such as ‘cat’, to talk about cats, 
and mentioning the word, as one would if pointing out that ‘cat’ has three letters.  The distinction 
becomes important when the possibility of mistaking use and mention arises, and philosophers 
often like to believe that those who do not share their views have made such a confusion”).
39
 Indeed, this is a primary area of complaint from conservative Justices, see, e.g., Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40 See generally Bernard Bailyn, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(Enlarged Edition) (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1992); Bernard Bailyn, TO BEGIN 
THE WORLD ANEW:  THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF THE AMERICA FOUNDERS (Knopf 2003).
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Calder v. Bull41or by the “established method” of the substantive due process 
cases42 provide imperfect legal definition to these rights.  Unless one is willing to 
throw out the centrality of individual rights to the constitutional experiment (I am 
not), then extratextual principles are unavoidable in the individual liberties 
context.
By contrast, the division of power between the federal and State
governments serves to serve only instrumental ends.  Whereas individual rights 
are ends in themselves, structural principles are not.  We do not place limits on 
the regulatory powers of the federal government because the State governments 
are like individual rights holders.43 State governments are creations of “we, the 
people” as well.  If so, then enumeration shouldn’t amount to anything more than 
enumeration:  the extratextual principles invoked to restrict Congress’s power to 
govern the States must themselves be only instrumental.  That is, they must be 
procedural or structural, not substantive, as they are in Usery or in the Eleventh 
Amendment context.  The Supreme Court should not invoke extratextual 
principles merely to freeze into place particular political settlements or 
institutional arrangements, unless those principles unambiguously indicate that 
the historic arrangement is instrumentally necessary for the perpetuation of the 
constitutional regime.  In other words, I’m loudly objecting to your independent 
States model of federalism, because it treats federalism problems like individual 
rights problems.
We don’t do that in the separation of power context.  Consider, for 
example, the Commander in Chief Clause.44  Surely this clause, like the 
Commerce Clause, is governed by enumeration-based limits.  Plainly, however,
the clause does not exist in order to preserve the State of military science in 1789.  
Nuclear weapons, stealth bombers, and aircraft carriers give the President vast, 
imperial powers—powers that surely would alarm the framers.  Yet it would be 
legally absurd to interpret the words “Army” and “Navy” not to authorize the 
41 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 -389 (1798) (Chase, J., seriatim).
42
 At the very least this method entails “protect[ing] those fundamental rights and liberties which 
are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,’[citations omitted] and 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed,’ [citation omitted]” and “the … fundamental liberty interest” in which can be 
“‘careful[ly] descri[bed]’” by reference to “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices,” 
Washington v. Glucksberg  521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997) (citations omitted).  It is not clear to 
what extent Lawrence v. Texas relaxes either the traditional characterization requirement or the 
strength of the required historical pedigree for new substantive due process rights, see, e.g., 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72. 
43 But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (explicitly discussing waiver of State
sovereign immunity in federal court as “the surrender of constitutional rights”)
44 U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and the militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service 
of the United States ….”).
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President to use these weapons on the theory that they are, for constitutional 
purposes, “nonarmy” and “nonnavy.” By and large, the Justices appear to have 
no such plans for the Commerce Clause.  Gun regulation, for some purposes, is 
off limits, but medical marijuana is not.  Unless we have a significantly more 
radical project of this kind, then we are adrift without guiding principle—we have 
essentially ad hoc limits on the commerce power.  Except for Justice Thomas45, 
there is no new federalism.
Worried,
S.M. 
Steve,
You’re being somewhat unfair.  The Commerce Clause cases aren’t really 
ad hoc.  Or, at least, Gonzales v. Raich46 shows that they don’t have to be.  I grant 
you that except for Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment, the opinions are 
pretty uninteresting.  Justice Stevens is at his muddied best—it is impossible to 
pin down his holding.  Can Congress legislate by categories or is there a required 
jurisdictional element in as applied cases?  I have absolutely no idea from reading 
the opinion.  And I have not seen Perez47 cited so much or so singularly ever 
before.  Justice O'Connor offers up much the same thing.  Where does this fuzzy 
lingo about historic spheres of sovereignty, encroachment, States as laboratories, 
and federalism as structural liberty all fit into a clear and coherent idea, principle, 
doctrine, or rule?  I would say that she hasn’t got the foggiest idea.  I don’t, 
frankly, see the Court returning to Usery any time soon.  Justice Thomas, as you 
note, is on his own.
It’s Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment48 that speaks to our 
disagreement.  He sees the case as an enumerated powers case, not one about 
federalism or State sovereignty.  The case presents a simple question about the 
extent of Congress's legislative power under Article I; Congress has the power to 
enact the Controlled Substances Act provision prohibiting intraState, medical use 
of marijuana because that regulation is necessary and proper to achieving a 
concededly permissible regulatory purpose under Congress’s core Commerce 
Clause powers—prohibiting the interState market in marijuana. 49  One could, of 
course, make the argument that the regulation was actually unnecessary because 
its contents could easily be extracted from the federal law without compromising 
45
 125 S.Ct. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46
 125 S.Ct. at 2195.
47 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding federal statute criminalizing “loan 
sharking” on the theory that the activity has substantial effects on interState commerce).
48
 125 S.Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
49 See United States v. Darby , 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Sullivan , 332 U.S. 689 
(1948).
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the Controlled Substances Act’s effectiveness, but for one reason or another this 
argument didn’t wash.50  In itself this is interesting for Justice Scalia—it is 
deferential, it rings of McCullough v. Maryland, and it balances interests.51  But I 
take it his point is very simple:  there was no federalism issue in the case.
This position, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with the weak form 
of extratextual federalism in Lopez and Morrison.  Perhaps Justice Scalia simply 
believes that when Congress has established a larger framework for regulating 
interState commerce under its undisputed power, deference under McCulloch and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause is appropriate.  In other words, I think you’re 
presenting a false dichotomy.  The alternative to the dissenters’ views in Raich is 
not necessarily your own brand of liberal federalism.
Regards,
R.B.
50 See Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2207-09; the converse of this proposition is also a live issue.  The 
distinction between regulations that regulate intraState economic activity because that activity has 
a substantial effect on interState commerce and those that regulate intraState noneconomic activity 
because it is a necessary part of a large federal regulatory framework, has never been so clearly 
expressed as in Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Raich.  Assuming the Supreme Court adopts his 
view, we think one might be able to challenge individual statutes on the theory that they bear no 
relationship to any legitimate larger scheme of regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of 
insterState commerce.  In other words, the law in question might now have to be sufficiently 
“schematic,” by some definition, to enable Congress to avoid the argument that it is simply 
interfering with State affairs.  The interesting implication is for some federal criminal provisions.  
Congress has a habit of legislating away one problem at a time, leaving us, in some areas, with a 
patchwork quilt of statutory provisions that have no evident collective purpose, let alone anything 
like a “schematic” character.  See Alex Kreit, Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial 
Activity?, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 198 (2004) (advocating such a standard:  “first, the 
broader scheme must be targeted at a commercial enterprise; second, the regulated actors or 
entities must be performing the specific activity as part of the enterprise”; and stating this “broader 
scheme analysis would be employed in substantial effects cases for statutes that fail the four prong 
Morrison test”).  Take, for example, the recent federal law that added killing a fetus to a broad 
range of federal criminal statutes resting on, e.g., the commerce power, see Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act, 18 U.S.C. 1841 (2004).  Under Raich the government might well have difficulty 
arguing that the fetus section was in any way related to the larger schematic of the range of federal 
criminal laws, which generally serve to protect specific governmental regulatory or institutional 
interests, like the national banking system.
51
 Justice Scalia is famously interested in rules of law.  See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil, 57 U CIN. L REV. 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Burnham v. Super. Ct.  of California, 495 U.S. 604, 626-27 
(1990) (arguing that Justice Brennan’s proposed test for personal jurisdiction, which relied a 
number of factors to determine whether to subject a transient defendant to process, was 
conceptually flawed:  “Thus, despite the fact that he manages to work the word ‘rule’ into his 
formulation, Justice BRENNAN's approach does not establish a rule of law at all, but only a 
‘totality of the circumstances’ test, guaranteeing what traditional territorial rules of jurisdiction 
were designed precisely to avoid:  uncertainty and litigation over the preliminary issue of the 
forum's competence”).
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II.  THE MOVING TARGET:  SOVEREIGNTY
Professor Bezanson,
I disagree.  Justice Scalia endorsed a theory of sovereignty in U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton52 that is I think is inconsistent with the lukewarm 
federalism of his Raich concurrence.  Term Limits involved a challenge to an 
Arkansas State constitutional provision that imposed term limits on candidates for 
Congress.  The Supreme Court struck down the provision on the theory that the 
States shouldn’t be permitted to interfere with the election of the federal 
legislature.53  Justice Thomas dissented on the opposing theory that “[n]othing in 
the Constitution deprives the people of each State of the power to prescribe 
eligibility requirements for … candidates ….  it raises no bar to action by the 
States or the people.”54 Justice Thomas’s dissent is backed up by a theory of 
political power and sovereignty:  “the people of the States,” he argues, “need not 
point to any affirmative grant of power in the Constitution in order to prescribe” 
laws that affect the federal government, because “[t]he ultimate source of the 
Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not 
the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”55 On one 
level this is an argument about governmental immunities.  On another, it is an 
image of constitutional power.  It’s something that flows from a source—like 
water, sound, or electricity.  What’s important is tracing power back to the source.  
Justice Thomas finds the source in the Article VII ratification procedure:  
“The Constitution took effect once it had been ratified by the people gathered in 
convention in nine different States. But the Constitution went into effect only 
‘between the States so ratifyi ng the same,’ … it did not bind the people of North 
Carolina until they had accepted it. In Madison's words, the popular consent upon 
which the Constitution's authority rests was ‘given by the people, not as 
individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and 
independent States to which they respectively belong.’” 56 Justice Thomas has 
52
 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, J., and 
Scalia, J.).
53 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783.
54 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed. 1961); J. Elliot, ed. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 94 (2nd ed. 1876); Justice Thomas’s footnote to this 
proposition may be even more important.  He argues:  “The ringing initial words of the 
Constitution – ‘We the People of the United States’ – convey something of the same idea.  (In the 
Constitution, after all, the ‘United States’ is consistently a plural noun.)  The Preamble that the 
Philadelphia Convention approved before sending the Constitution to the Committee of Style is 
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argued that “the people of the several States are the only true source of power.” 57
And so the Tenth Amendment, I gather, is an express articulation of this view
rather than a tautologous confirmation of enumeration:  “As far as the Federal 
Constitution is concerned, then, the States can exercise all powers that the 
Constitution does not withhold from them and they are constitutionally supreme.  
All power may be traced to them.  The Federal Government and the States thus 
face different default rules:  Where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of 
a particular power – that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly 
or by necessary implication – the Federal Government lacks that power and the 
States enjoy it.”58  The unStated premise of Justice Thomas’s claim, I gather, is 
that our ability to trace, ex post, the lines of delegation is what really matters 
when deciding whether Congress has some power.  That’s not what we’re saying 
Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence says—he’s clearer than Justice Stevens, but 
Scalia still muddies the waters.
Bemused,
S.M.
Steve,
I’m intrigued.  Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas in Term Limits, but I 
don’t know that he’s ever expressed anything quite this strong in his own voice.  
It’s best to remember that a Supreme Court Justice doesn’t necessarily agree with 
every logical implication of every opinion he or she joins.  Perhaps a 
disagreement between Justices Scalia and Thomas (and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
whose votes track Thomas’s in both cases) was submerged in Term Limits.59  I 
have never thought that Justice Scalia is especially committed to returning the 
Constitution from exile.  But what, exactly, is the character of the disagreement 
we’ve identified?  What is, or what would be, the counterview that permits Scalia 
to concur in Raich?
At sea,
R.B.
even clearer.  It began:  ‘We the people of the States of New -Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-
Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvannia, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia ….’  Scholars have 
suggested that the Committee of Style adopted the current language because it was not clear that 
all the States would actually ratify the Constitution.  In this instance, I agree with the majority that 
the Committee’s edits did not work a substantive change in the Constitution.”  
57 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 847 (citing and quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (Black, 
J., plurality opinion) (“‘The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its power and 
authority have no other source’”) (Thomas omits footnote).
58 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 847-48 (emphasis added).
59
 Another instance of an incompletely theorized agreement, perhaps?  See Sunstein, supra, at note 
22.
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Professor Bezanson,
It’s hard to say.  Perhaps from Justice Thomas’s perspective, the problem 
with Scalia’s opinion in Raich is just that it muddies the ultimate sources of 
sovereignty.  Justice Scalia’s federal power to regulate intraState noneconomic 
activity as long as there is a larger regulatory framework is a creature without 
obvious genealogy.  It’s difficult to trace to its origin.  It is as if Justice Thomas 
believes that one must have a Parliament or a delegatee legislature, but not both.  
In effect, Justice Scalia strives to avoid this momentous choice.  He gives us 
neither Parliament nor elemental, foundational, original States.   Some kind of 
legislative Chimera.  Perhaps he simply cares a great deal less about tracing the 
strands of delegation and properly characterizing Congress than does Justice 
Thomas.  
But I think that’s somewhat inconsistent for Justice Scalia.  His separation 
of powers jurisprudence devotes a great deal of care to abstract questions of 
authority and the characterization of government power.  Let’s call this 
constitutional “formalism.”  A formalist, in this sense, “generally assume[s] that 
the Constitution recognizes three kinds of functions—legislative, executive, and 
judicial—that must be assigned to the corresponding branch of government,” so 
that “separation-of-powers issues turn largely on the classification of functions.”60
This bears a close relation to late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century legal 
formalism.61  Perhaps it’s the same thing.
In any event, Justice Scalia’s dissents in the independent counsel statute 
case, Morrison v. Olson,62 and the first Sentencing Guidelines case, Mistretta v. 
60
 Jesse Choper, Richard Fallon, Jr., Yale Kamisar, and Steven Shiffrin, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS (9th Edition) 155 (West 2003) (citing Peter Strauss, The Place 
of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
573 (1984) and Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1522-31 (1991)).
61
 Gerald Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law:  A View form Century’s End, 49 
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1999) (“The formalists clearly believed that the law was comprised of 
principles—including definitions, concepts, and doctrines—broad in their generality, few in their 
number, and clear enough to permit answers to the questions of law to be more or less directly 
deduced.  The formalists also believed that the law generally is, and should be, unresponsive to 
particular factual contexts and circumstances.  They wrote as if such principles had an existence of 
their own, quite apart from what judges or legislators might actually have said or done, and that 
these principles were valid on grounds that were indifferent to what we have come to see as either 
the needs of society or the purposes that law might serve.  Although such principles might develop 
and evolve over time, they did not do so in accordance with society's changing needs.  Neither 
were they influenced by custom and practice nor by what people might ‘feel’ to be ‘just’”) 
(footnotes omitted).
62 Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting from decision to uphold as 
constitutional the Independent Counsel Statute’s provision for termination for “good cause”); see 
id., 699 (quoting the Article II Vesting Clause and stating:  “That is what this suit is about.  Power.  
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United States ,63 focus on the correct abstract characterization of the government 
powers at issue.64 I’m associating Justice Scalia with the mode of argument that 
appears in the opinions for the Court in Nixon v.United States 65, INS v. Chada 66, 
Clinton v. New York67, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.68, Dames & 
Moore v. Regan,69 and Youngstown Steel Sheet & Tube Co.70 The much-
discussed “unitary executive” theory, too.71 The common feature here is that 
formalism is not a context-sensitive approach. It relies on the courts to enforce 
clearly drawn, bright-line boundaries between governmental institutions and
powers.  And we can see that attitude heartily at work in Scalia’s dissents in 
Olsen and Mistretta, and Thomas’s dissent in Term Limits.  All three opinions 
treat power as the plenary right to operate within a defined space—that’s the 
metaphor here, room to act, and to do whatever one wants within bounded limits.  
I think it is fair to label Justice Scalia a formalist in this sense.  It’s an attitude 
that’s hostile to the Necessary and Proper Clause, so why not then label his Raich 
concurrence, and its reliance on implied powers and federal interests, an 
inconsistency?  Why should the same Constitution that provides a springboard for 
The allocation of power among Congress, the President, and the courts in such fashion as to 
preserve the equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish--so that ‘a gradual concentration of 
the several powers in the same department,’ Federalist No. 51, p. 321 (J. Madison), can effectively 
be resisted. 
63 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting from decision to 
uphold as constitutional the Sentencing Reform Act’s establishment of the United States 
Sentencing Commission) (“I dissent from today’s decision because I can find no place within our 
constitutional system for an agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other 
than the making of laws”).
64 See also Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 815 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (holding that an interested party in a lawsuit may not be appointed to 
prosecute indirect criminal contempt proceedings; Justice Scalia concurred on a strict separation of 
powers theory, and would have held that officials of the judicial branch cannot initiate such 
prosecutions, but may only refer potential prosecutions to the executive branch).
65 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
66 INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
67 Clinton v. City of New York (Line Item Veto Case), 524 U.S. 417 (1997).
68 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
69 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
70 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
71 See generally Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First 
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (Summer 1997); Steven G. Calabresi and 
Christopher Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 667 (Summer 2003); Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher Yoo, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(Nov. 2004); Christopher Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, and Anthony Colangelo, The Unitary 
Executive in the Modern Era, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (Jan. 2005); see John Yoo, THE POWERS OF 
WAR AND PEACE:  THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (University of Chicago 
press 2005).
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formalist analysis in the separation of powers context be read any differently in 
the federalism context?
Sincerely,
S.M.
Steve,
I’d guess that you really mean to say that it shouldn’t be.  And that Justice 
Scalia should abandon his formalist ways for the alternative:  “functionalism,” 
which “takes as its foundational commitment the different but equally familiar 
ideal of ‘checks and balances’” and argues that “there can be no rigid division of 
governmental functions into three sharp categories, each the distinctive province 
of a single branch of government” so that “actions and institutional arrangements 
should be measured by reference to … characteristic functions of the separation of 
powers.”72  That is, what is separating the powers supposed to do?73
But I think that Justice Scalia’s views are more subtle than you’re letting 
on.  Why must he err everywhere for erring once?  Furthermore I think one can 
make the case that Justice Thomas has more or different formalistic commitments.  
For example, in Term Limits Justice Thomas coyly suggested that Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transport Association, which repudiated Usery, was 
wrongly decided and flatly Stated that the Term Limits majority misinterpreted 
McCulloch when it argued that the Constitution implies a prohibition on State-
mandated electorial qualifications for congressional candidates because the Tenth 
Amendment delegates all powers that aren’t at least mentioned in the text.74 This 
is not quite Justice Scalia’s structural formalism, which I take to be exemplified 
by his dissent in the independent counsel case, Morrison v. Olsen. 
72
 Jesse Choper, Richard Fallon, Jr., Yale Kamisar, and Steven Shiffrin, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS (9th Edition) 155 (footnote omitted)..
73
 As we are using the term “functionalism,” it would encompass the Supreme Court’s deferential, 
interest-balancing approach in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 316 .  Justice Jackson’s famous 
concurrence in Youngstown Steel Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 
(Jackson, J., “concurring in the judgment and the opinion of the court”), comes to mind.
74 Term Limits, at 852-853 (Thomas, J.) (specifically referring to Garcia and arguing that “[w]hen 
[the Supreme Court is] asked to decide whether a congressional statute that appears to have been 
authorized by Article I is nonetheless unconstitutional because it invades a protected sphere of 
State sovereignty, it may well be appropriate for [the Court] to inquire into what [it] ha[s] called 
the ‘traditional aspects of State sovereignty’” and arguing that the Term Limits majority’s reliance 
on MuCulloch v. Maryland “is misplaced” because while “McCulloch did make clear that a power 
need not be ‘expressly’ delegated to the United States or prohibited to the States in order to fall 
outside the Tenth Amendment's reservation” it is nevertheless the case that “McCulloch did not 
qualify this observation by indicating that the question also turned on whether the States had 
enjoyed the power before the framing. To the contrary, McCulloch seemed to assume that the 
people had ‘conferred on the general government the power contained in the constitution, and on 
the States the whole residuum of power’”).
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Earnestly,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
Maybe you have a point.  In a 2004 Spending Clause case called Sabri v. 
United States , the Supreme Court upheld the federal statute criminalizing bribery 
of State, local, or tribal officials when the program receives at least $10,000 in 
federal funds as an exercise of the Spending Clause.75  In that case, Justice 
Thomas concurred in the judgment.76  He would have upheld the statute as a valid 
exercise of the commerce power.77  He disagreed, however, with the majority’s 
conclusion that the statute was a valid exercise of the spending power.  
Specifically, he argued that the statute could not be justified as a necessary and 
proper extension of the Spending Clause power because it ran afoul of the Court’s 
test for applying the Necessary and Proper Clause:  the law must be “‘plainly 
adapted’” to some permissible end enumerated in Article I.78  Justice Thomas 
proposed his own test for determining whether a statute is “plainly adapted”:  “it 
would seem,” he wrote, “necessary to show some obvious, simple and direct 
relation between the statute and the enumerated power.”79  That isn’t rational 
basis.  And it isn’t nearly as deferential as Justice Scalia is in Raich.  So perhaps 
there’s a distinction to be drawn.  Could it really just be about judicial review?
Cheers,
S.M.
III.  SOVEREIGNTY DIVIDED:  A FRACTURED FEDERALISM
Steve,
Quite possibly.  But let’s shift gears for a bit.  With all this talk of the 
conservative view in Term Limits, I wonder if the majority opinion is any more 
coherent.  I don’t think so.  Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court doesn’t answer 
the most important question in the case.  Nothing about either the existence of a 
national Constitution or the concept of enumerated powers compels him to 
strikedown the Arkansas constitutional amendment at issue in Term Limits.  
Justice Stevens States  that the “State- imposed restriction is contrary to the 
‘fundamental principle of our representative democracy,’ embodied in the 
Constitution, that ‘the people should choose whom they please to govern 
75 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
76 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
77 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 614 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
78 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 612 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415).
79 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 613 (quoting just previous to the quoted text to WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 898 (1991)).
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them,’”80 but stating and proving are different things.  Furthermore, this particular 
formulation is deeply question-begging:  the conclusion (that the Constitution is a 
unifying document of the whole people) is part of the premise (that the 
Constitution is an act of delegation by the whole people).  And it almost has the 
ring of unitary government to it and I think we both agree that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist is right to say that that’s not what the Constitution establishes.
True, Justice Stevens invokes Powell v. McCormack81 and the John 
Wilkes affair,82 but these examples are less illuminating than one might think.  In 
the Powell case, Congress voted to “exclude” a member accused of financial 
improprieties before he was seated by majority vote rather than to “expel” him 
after he was seated by the constitutionally mandated two-thirds vote.83  The 
Supreme Court, in effect, ordered the House of Representatives to seat him.84  Mr. 
Wilkes was a Member of Parliament in the Seventeenth Century, who printed his 
criticism of a Franco-British treaty; Wilkes’s scurrilous journalism “earned [him] 
a conviction for seditious libel,” nearly two years in prison, and expulsion from 
Parliament.85  Wilkes’s district repeatedly re-elected him to his seat; Parliament 
repeatedly prevented him from taking it; and eventually, Wilkes’s political 
fortunes reversed and “the House of Commons voted to expunge the resolutions 
that had expelled [him] and had declared him ineligible, labeling those prior 
resolutions ‘subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this 
kingdom.’”86
Justice Stevens also reviewed American historical materials.  He cites The 
Federalist for the proposition that the “plan of the Constitutional Convention did 
not contemplate ‘an entire consolidation of the States into one complete national 
sovereignty,’ but only a partial consolidation in which ‘the State governments 
would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and 
which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.’” 87  But 
that principle doesn’t really answer the Tenth Amendment argument.  Justice 
Stevens gets to the heart of his argument when he invokes McCulloch v. 
Maryland to argue that “the text of the Tenth Amendment draws a basic 
distinction between the powers of the newly created Federal Government and the 
80 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783 (citing and quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 
(1969)).
81 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)
82 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 788-90.
83 Powell, 395 U.S. at 489-93; U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, 2.
84 Powell, 395 U.S. at 549-50 (ordering retroactive reinStatement—Mr. Powell had already been 
elected to the next Conrgess, which was already underway when the Supreme Court reviewed the 
case).
85 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 789-90.
86 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 790. 
87 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
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powers retained by the pre-existing sovereign States.  As Chief Justice Marshall 
explained, ‘it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by 
the States.  These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the 
people of the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution, 
what they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that 
instrument.’”88 Stevens surely has the winning argument here.  The powers of the 
State governments are, constitutionally, what they are.  They were created by the 
act of ratification no less then the federal government’s powers were.  So
someone claiming State power under the  Tenth Amendment has to point to
somehting more than simply the fact of omission from the four corners of the 
Constitution to make a really compelling Tenth Amendment argument.  If this 
isn’t true, then McCulloch was wrongly decided,89 and Justice Thomas’s 
arguments in Sabri and Raich were not too extreme but rather too moderate.
But this is all rather beside the point.  Justice Stevens has got to point to 
something more than the text as well, because the Qualifications Clause doesn’t 
obviously forbid the States from establishing additional qualifications for 
congressional candidates.  In some sense, he has got to be saying that the States 
shouldn’t have that power.  He must look into the murky depths to divine what is 
properly among the original retained powers of the States.  Inscrutable common 
law judging, that.  
But in this respect, Justice Stevens is fairly straightforward about what the 
Court is doing.  Justice Stevens argues that pointing to the missing prohibition on 
additional qualifications “overlooks the revolutionary character of the 
Government that the Framers conceived,” because “the Framers were presented 
with, and eventually adopted a variation of, ‘a plan not merely to amend the 
Articles of Confederation but to create an entirely new National Government with 
a National Executive, National Judiciary, and a National Legislature.’ In adopting 
that plan, the Framers envisioned a uniform national system, rejecting the notion 
that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creating a direct link 
between the National Government and the people of the United States.” 90  That is, 
88 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 
(1819)) (emphasis added).  Justice Thomas took issue with this argument in the context of 
McCulloch, see note 58, supra.
89 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801 (quoting Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat. ) at 436) (In that case, “the 
Court rejected the argument that the Constitution's silence on the subject of State power to tax 
corporations chartered by Congress implies that the States have ‘reserved’ power to tax such 
federal instrumentalities. ‘[An] ‘original right to tax’ such federal entities ‘never existed, and the 
question whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise.”  The very next sentence of the Court’s 
decision is even clearer. “In language that presaged Justice Story's argument, Chief Justice 
Marshall concluded: ‘This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which they 
originally possessed’”).
90 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 803.
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the Constitution creates what the Articles didn’t:  a national legislature.91  And the 
States can’t interfere with the structural rules that create and constitute that 
legislature.  That’s a pragmatic, almost common-law, approach to this problem.  It 
makes a great deal of sense to me, and, I suspect, to you.  It’s also a lot more 
satisfying than ghostly appeals to sovereignty.
Inquiring, 
R.B.
Professor Bezanson, 
Well, surely the Term Limits majority is right to say that Representatives 
are federal officers—even though they are “chosen by separate constituencies” 
they become “servants of the people of the United States” when elected, as 
opposed to mere “delegates appointed by separate, sovereign States.” 92 Perhaps 
this rhetoric is the handmaiden to your eminently pragmatic point—if we didn’t 
act as if the office of Representative were essentially federal in character, the
States would effectively control the membership of the House.  But I think there’ s 
something more complicated at work here.  
The Term Limits Court rejected Justice Thomas’s more specific argument 
that “because the States ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate power 
only through the States or by acting in their capacities as citizens of particular 
States”; rather, the Court maintained, the Constitution “was submitted to the 
whole people” of the country—who only met in separate places to complete the 
act of ratification.93 I think it’s fair to say that Justice Thomas believes the 
ratification effected a one-directional delegation.  Power goes from the people as 
citizens of the States to the federal government.  Indeed, Justice Thomas sees 
evidence for his bottom-up approach in the fact the Constitution provides for no 
election of any officer by the whole people of the nation—every election, even the 
presidential election, is mediated through the citizen’s citizenship of a State.94
But Justice Stevens sees something different in the fact that the States retain their 
salience in the Constitution’s election scheme:  complex layers of delegation and 
redelegation.  The ratifying population delegated the power to hold federal 
elections to the federal level by ratifying the Constitution, and through the 
91 See Amar, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 57-64 (arguing that the Congress created 
by the Constitution of 1789 was qualitatively different than that created by the Articles of 
Confederation, in that, among other things, it had “‘legislative’” powers and could enact “‘law,’” 
which the Article Congress did not have and could not do).
92 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838.
93 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 840 (quoting McCulloch, 4 Wheat. at 403) (emphasis added). 
94 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 859-60 (“The Georgia citizen who is unaware of this distinction will 
have it pointed out to him as soon as he tries to vote in a Massachusetts congressional election”).
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Constitution they were re-delegated a second time to the States— that is, the 
conduct of elections was “delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States .”95
Is there anything but a choice between dueling one-directional constructs?  
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy offers a multidirectional alternative:
In one sense it is true that ‘the people of each State retained their separate 
political identities,’ for the Constitution takes care both to preserve the 
States and to make use of their identities and structures at various points in 
organizing the federal union. It does not at all follow from this that the 
sole political identity of an American is with the State of his or her 
residence.  It denies the dual character of the Federal Government which is 
its very foundation to assert that the people of the United States do not 
have a political identity as well, one independent of, though consistent 
with, their identity as citizens of the State of their residence.  It must be 
recognized that ‘for all the great purposes for which the Federal 
government was formed, we are one people, with one common country.’96
That is to say that “we, the people” have multiple political identities.  Our States 
have complex interacting sovereignties and our citizens have complex interacting 
political capacities.  I am inclined to side with Justice Kennedy over Justice 
Stevens.  The Constitution was ratified only once.  In the moment of ratification, 
political power didn’t flow one way or the other.  The political power of the 
people was singular, more or less mixed together—as in a stew.  And “we, the 
people” ladled it out to different agents for different purposes.
There’s much to be admired here.  Surely the people have a right to see 
their governments work independently within the proper bounds of their 
respective constitutional charters without troublesome meddling from their 
counterparts at the other level, yet equally surely, all power is not fractured, with 
the federal government and the States locked into a struggle for shares of the 
original delegation.  I’m reminded of Professor Amar’s suggestion that the States 
are meant to fight against the federal government for the rights of the people.97
And Professor Pettys’s article about “federalism’s forgotten marketplace”—
competition for hearts and minds.98  There’s something here that is intellectually 
more appealing than Justice Stevens’s unitary government and Justice Thomas’s 
95 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 804 (emphasis added). 
96 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 840 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (which in 
turn quotes The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) and cites Crandall 
v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43 (1868) (“‘The people of these United States constitut one 
nation” and “have a government in which all of them are deeply interested”)).
97
 Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425 (1987).
98
 Todd Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 
VANDERBILT L. REV. 329 (2003).
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fractured government.  Law, like life, is complicated, and we shouldn’t expect the 
arrows of power and delegation to point all in one direction.
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
Be that as it may, none of this provides any guidance to courts.  I’ll hold 
off on commenting about Justice Kennedy for a bit.  Justice Stevens’s view in 
Term Limits that the States have no power over qualifications rests ultimately on 
the conclusion that the Constitution did not “delegate to” the States the power to
govern elections to federal office.  There are two possible explanations for this 
conclusion:  (1) that the specific history of the qualifications provisions of the 
Constitution supports an exclusive federal power (quite apart from the way other 
power-granting provisions of the Constitution might be read); or (2) that as a 
general rule all matters lying in the “shadow” of any federal power (implied 
powers?) should be read as part of the federal power itself, thus pre-empting State
power, in the absence of delegation. Stevens, frankly, does not make the case for 
alternative (1).  Yet alternative (2) seems, to me, to be untenable and flatly 
inconsistent with broad areas of doctrine, such as McCulloch, the Commerce 
Clause, and the negative Commerce Clause cases, which are the stuff of balancing 
and policy and necessity, and not of rules based strictly on philosophical 
definitions of power.  Moreover, the idea of “implied powers” (except in Curtis-
Wright99 by some accounts) has never been accepted by the Court and was, as I 
recall, pretty clearly rejected by the framers.100
Justice Stevens’s idea that “we, the people” as a whole granted, 
effectively, all powers to the federal government except for a (largely federally 
determined) residuum of uncertain impliedly delegated authority (not sovereignty) 
to the States seems historically and politically untenable, just as Justice Thomas’s 
opposite view is untenable.  Enumeration, instead, consists of a workable and 
instrumental form of limitation on power, not as a manifestation of sovereignty.  
Of course I’ve overstated Justice Stevens’s view.  But not unfairly, I think, and 
for what it’s worth, doing so makes my point more graphically.  More basically, 
I’m struck by how irrelevant both Stevens’s and Thomas’s two source-of-power 
constructs are to the result of the case.  If Justice Stevens’s view is right, that 
conclusion does not mean that unlimited congressional tenure is part of the 
implied exclusive federal power.  If Justice Thomas is right, that does not mean 
that qualifications exclude length of service and thus lie within his pro-State
default rule.  The constructs, to be sure, lend a certain background air to the 
decisions, but nothing really specific to the resolution of the issue presented.
99 United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
100 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Add to this the fact that, practically if not politically and constitutionally, 
neither the federal government nor the States look anything like the constructs 
present them.  In fact, in practice, and in historical pattern, our system of federal 
and State governments cannot be described as consisting of one sovereign and a 
bunch of delegees.  Both are, or are not, sovereign in some ways.  Both are 
repositories of direct will from their respective polities.  And in the case of the 
federal government, where the representatives, while federal in duty, are elected 
locally, and where, until the Seventeenth Amendment,101 Senators were distinctly 
State agents, the pattern of sovereignty is deeply ambiguous.  Process-based, one 
might say, rather than power-based.
As for Justice Thomas, it seems to me that he has the better of the 
historical interpretations, but in the end his interpretation doesn’t compel his 
default rule:  literal and narrow reading of federal power with the federal 
government as the delegee.  Instead, it reflects the fact that at the beginning both 
governments were to be “sovereign” in unforeseen ways, and to some extent each 
would have to muddle through with the other against that background.  The job 
was to transcend differences of the narrow and regional sort in order to make a 
nation.  To decide the case on abstract constructs that do not at all flow from the 
history, on default rules, and on the presence or absence of pre-existing power, 
seems, well, silly and unecessarily ideological.
So I confess:  I have a growing, healthy skepticism about pure principle 
and coherent philosophy when it comes to “federalism” and its meaning.  So I 
have a dispute with both you and Justice Kennedy.  It’s all too far removed from 
practicality.  We can say that there’s dual sovereignty, but it doesn’t change 
anything.  That Statement doesn’t explain much of the Constitution.  Remember 
that the framers were practical men.  Maybe when it comes to federalism and 
sovereignty there was no overarching conception, but instead a set of practical, 
yet untested, structures that were conducive to limitation of power and a search 
for accommodation and adjustment to change over time.  
Sincerely,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson, 
I’m not quite willing as you are to dispense with sovereignty rhetoric 
completely.  Surely the idea of sovereignty is relevant.  Surely the liberal Justices 
now on the Supreme Court have done less than they might to offer a compelling 
countertheory of State sovereignty. But I think something more can be said for 
their general approach of balancing federal and State interests across the board. If 
we adopt Justice Kennedy’s way of thinking, there’s no need to say that the States 
101 U.S. CONST. Amdt. XVII § 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years ….”).
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get table scraps. Rather, “the people” are the ultimate source for both federal and 
State sovereign power.102 They freely elect to entrust some of it to the federal 
government and some to State governments. The symbol of that delegation is the 
Constitution's text. Neither the federal nor State governments need be superior. 
Neither need possess ultimate sovereignty. What we have, rather, is sovereignty 
divided.
It’s true that all limits on  federal power are enumerative.  But it does not 
follow that State  and federal power see-saw with one another.  If that were true, it 
would be as if the source of State constitutional power were federal 
enumeration.103 The same people underlie both federal and State pow er, but the 
powers of each are conceptually independent of one another. The fact that time 
and technology have elevated this constitutional provision above the others is an 
argument for amending the Constitution, not bootstrapping abstract principles of 
federalism into constitutional law.  Thus nowadays State sovereignty may not 
mean very much in practical terms, but it remains unchanged. Nothing about the 
concept of State sovereignty guarantees that it retains, or should retain, its once 
strong practical importance as time progresses. I think you agree.  But if you do, I 
just don’t see how you can avoid conceding that some complex Kennedy-style 
approach to sovereignty is valid.
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
Now we’re getting somewhere!  The subject is sovereignty and whether it 
has any real or consistent meaning—and perhaps whether it should have any 
meaning in the Twenty-first Century.  Let me start us again from the foundations.  
We want to get a handle on the essential nature of the relationship between the 
federal and State “sovereigns.”  What, precisely, is the union?  And what are the 
102
 For a compelling explanation of this theory and the corporate law metaphor, see Amar, Of 
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. at 1425.
103 Enumeration itself is not a source of State power. As an empirical matter, most limitations on 
federal regulatory authority give the States freedom to experiment. But nothing about the concept 
of federal enumeration compels this.  The States could have limited and enumerated powers as 
well. In some instances, they clearly do. If the Constitution permits the federal government, and 
only the federal government, to engage in some class of regulatory actions, then an enumeration-
based prohibition on some group of actions within that class does not function as a grant of 
authority to the States.  The treay power is the clearest example.  A limit on the treaty power based 
on a new interpretation of the word “treaty” is not a grant of power to the States.  The Constitution 
expressly forbids States to make treaties with foreign powers, U.S. CONST., Art. I., § 10, cl. 3.  
The same ought to be true of the Commerce Clause, and indeed of all federal powers.  The danger 
Morrison-type reasoning poses on this front is that this insight will be lost.  We think that’s how 
the dissenters in Term Limits got it wrong. They failed to analyze the questions of federal and 
State power as conceptually independent.
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ground rules for dispute resolution?  The concept of sovereignty matters here, but 
in the United States Reports , it is selective, perhaps inconsistent, and wears many 
faces.  The Commerce Clause cases are cases about sovereignty only in the weak 
sense that the constitutional device of enumeration is a form or manifestation of 
sovereignty.  Which, of course, on some level it is.  The truism that federal 
sovereignty is confined to those powers assigned to the federal government (some 
of which are shared with others:  States, other public actors, private parties, and 
individuals; some of which are concurrent with rival, but subordinate, powers in 
the States) is, after all, true.  So Lopez and Morrison are about sovereignty, but in 
a largely indirect sense:  the content of federal power, which is supreme when 
possessed, and the interests of the losing party if that power is exceeded.
The sovereignty question gets considerably more interesting when one 
shifts focus to intergovernmental immunities, and specifically to regulatory 
immunities.  It was here that the Court tried to define the meaning or content of 
sovereignty in a long line of cases culminating in National League of Cities v. 
Usery.104  There the Court effectively defined the minimum of sovereignty as a 
State possessed of some measure of policy-making discretion at the legislative 
level, responsible to its polity and acting in the polity’s interests; a modicum of 
executive power and discretion independent of control by the federal sovereign; 
and judicial authority over a range of subjects not subject to federal oversight, by 
judges not subject to federal employment mandates.105  And finally, and perhaps 
more importantly, a measure of power of self definition–or in an anthropomorphic 
mode, some free will.  The terminology employed by the Supreme Court in 
service of this vision of sovereignty is too convoluted to warrant extended 
recitation here—consisting as is does of “traditional functions” and such 
inescapably vague terms.
In Garcia, of course, the Court pitched this stuff out and elected instead to 
adopt a process-based or “structural” definition of State sovereignty. It did so to 
everyone’s, but especially liberals’, relief.  States are entitled to participate in the 
decisions of the federal sovereign, both by acting as a federal agent—a Senator 
from a State, a signator to a compact, etc.—and as a lobbyist or advocate able to 
persuade, or threaten, other federal actors.  The States, in a word, are part of the 
federal sovereign.  The idea we’re grasping at is somewhat like the idea of one’s 
forming a partnership with a corporation owned entirely by oneself.  This is a bit 
strange, or at least a bit at odds with a view of States and the federal government 
as separate sovereigns, since one sovereign (federal) consists in part of the other.  
It is hard to think of superior and subordinate relationships when the States are 
104
 426 U.S. at 833.
105 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (absent “plain Statement” in law, federal age 
discrimination act can't be applied to State judges ).
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both subordinate and superior.  But that is an argument against the rhetoric of 
dominance and antagonism more than it is a principled critique of the complex 
conception of sovereignty at work in Garcia.
Garcia is strange from a purely ideological perspective, because it assigns 
decision-making power to federal and State governments by setting up “rules of 
the game” for a competition.  At the same time it muddles the true identity of the 
prevailing sovereign because the subordinate or “other” sovereign (the State) is 
itself a part of the federal sovereign.  Can it be that in this sense the “true” or pure 
independent sovereign is the State?  Perhaps.  B ut Garcia, it seems, is more than a 
decision that lays the procedural ground rules for conflict or cooperation.  It 
recognizes the federal sovereign as unique, truly dual in itself, and therefore not 
limited by substantive areas of authority.  Its acts are the acts of the State
sovereigns—the acts of the united States .
There are other aspects of the intergovernmental immunity question, 
however, and it is not altogether clear that they follow the same patterns.  First, 
there is immunity from suit:  the Eleventh Amendment and all the variations of 
the theme.  When can one sovereign bring another to heel under its law, privately 
enforced; or in the second sovereign’s own courts; or even by the first sovereign 
in its courts?106  In relation to the States, the answ ers to these questions, if we take 
them to lie in the nature of sovereignty, seem all and ultimately to rest on 
dignitary interests:  the indignity of a State being held liable to individuals in the 
courts of the other sovereign; the indignity of a State being subjected to pay ing
damages assessed under the law of the other, federal sovereign, even (or 
especially) in the State’s own courts.  F orced self-flagellation, that.  If one runs 
these ideas out to their logical extremes, one can claim that the State s overeign 
should not be subject to suit enforcing federal law against it even if the plaintiff is 
the federal government itself.107  Being subject to regulation by the federal 
government is one thing; being forced to comply in court is another.  The 
indignity of it all!
The immunity works the other way, too, both at the judicial/jurisdictional 
and the regulatory (and taxing) level.  But my sense is that the basic reason for 
this lies elsewhere than dignity.  It lies instead in power and supremacy.  There is 
no doubt that when the federal government acts within its power, it acts as a 
whole that excludes anything else, particularly regulation at the hands of the 
States.  The Supremacy Clause doesn’t provide much explanation.  After a brief 
foray or two into language of reciprocity (States can’t tax the federal government 
106 U.S. CONST., Amdt. XI.  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000).
107
 An extreme that the Supreme Court has quite explicitly rejected, Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (citing 
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. at 328-29) (act of ratification waived immunity to suit by federal 
government).
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and likewise the federal government can’t tax the States – even State employees 
at one point108), all pretense of reciprocity fell away, and the immunities rule 
became the Supremacy Clause writ large.109 As with preemption,110 States have 
no power to tax the federal government or its instrumentalities, but the federal 
government can, if it chooses, tax the States and their instrumentalities.
So in this area of immunities, sovereignty talk whirls around the States.  
But it must be a strange kind of sovereignty:  very limited in reach in view of the 
Supremacy Clause and very specific its definition of sovereignty.  Is this the 
explanation for all of the “dignity” and “respect” talk?  I think States deserv e 
respect as governments—and fear, too—as do all governments.111  Other 
governments should deal with the States carefully.  I dislike self -flagellation, 
compelled or not.  But even with all of that, I fail to see where the idea that 
dignity is the theme tying all of these things together came from, and what dignity 
has to do, really, with a government that should be obeyed because it has power, 
and feared for that reason too.  Dignity may be part of the myth of royalty, but 
States are there to serve us, to respect us, not the other way around.  There may be 
really good reasons for limiting suits against States, but I don’t see them as related 
to dignity or even to sovereignty, as opposed to practical governance and public 
policy.  Under this view, the Eleventh Amendment emanates no penumbras, but 
just plain words that must be obeyed, and no more.
Let me add a final word, or perhaps a final nail in the coffin, for “dignity” 
under the Eleventh Amendment.  Think of Ex Parte Young.112  When the States 
violate federal law, don’t sue them directly for money damages.  Instead sue the 
State officers, in their official capacity for equitable relief, and in their private 
capacity for money damages.113  This hardly comports with the State’s “dignity,” 
108 Dobbins v. Comm'rs, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842)(State tax on a federal officer's salary); 
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871) (federal tax on salary of State judge). 
109 E.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (sustaining federal income tax on selected 
State and local municipal bonds).
110 See note 30, supra.
111
 Leaving open the question whether fear should be thought of as the very basis of American 
government.  See John Adams, Thoughts on Government (Boston, 1776), rpt. In Charles Hyneman 
and Donald Lutz, eds., AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING OF THE FOUNDING ERA 401, 402 (Liberty 
Fund 1983) (““Fear is the foundation of most governments; but it is so sordid and brutal a passion, 
and renders men in whose breasts it predominates so stupid and miserable, that Americans will not 
be likely to approve of any political institution which is founded on it”); available online at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/adams/filmmore/ps_thoughts.html (last accessed 20 February 
2006).
112 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that State sovereign immunity does not relieve Attorney General 
of Minnesota from duty to comply with prosepctive equitable orders to comply with federal law).
113 Alden, 527 U.S. at 757 (1999) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238 (1974); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459 (1945)) (“Even a suit for money 
damages may be prosecuted against a State officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional 
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and indeed it is arguably a greater indignity to bring a State’s governor or 
legislators, for example, to answer personally for choices made (and, it should be 
noted, protected by eloquently waxed language in Usery114) on behalf of the State. 
The State, after all, is but the collection of people and their choices in governance 
at any point in time.
Another more recent version of intergovernmental immunities is the 
“commandeering” rule:  the federal government cannot employ the State
coercively as its agent to formulate, enforce, or adjudicate federal policy (except, 
with adjudication, for the Supremacy Clause115).  Commandeering is Garcia-like:  
non-substantive and wholly procedural or structural, “Cross the line and you’re 
out.”  But it is not  a rules of negotiation or participation doctrine, as Garcia seems 
to be.  It is instead a line in the sand.  There is no balancing of State and federal or 
public interests here.116  It is, rather, a formal rule with a winner declared if the 
rules are violated.  Indeed (and evocatively), it is not even clear that a State can 
agree to be commandeered, for the vice is the federal government’s misbehavior 
in making policy without the stomach actually to confess to it and carry it out.  
What’s going on here?  Is it indignity visited on the State, or is it  punishment 
visited on the federal government for overreaching?  Is it the presence of State
sovereignty or the absence of federal sovereignty?  If it’s the former we’re back in 
the land of kings and dignity as the meaning of sovereignty.  If the latter we are in 
the rules-laid- down territory:  sovereignty means simply what one can and cannot 
do, and has no larger meaning.
or wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not 
from the State treasury but from the officer personally”)
114 Usery, 426 U.S. at 854-55 (“… we have reaffirmed today that the States as States stand on a 
quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of 
Congress' power to regulate commerce,” a power which “Congress may not exercise that power so 
as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct 
of integral governmental functions are to be made.  We agree that such assertions of power if 
unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in [Maryland v.] Wirtz, 
allow ‘the National Government (to) devour the essentials of State sovereignty,’ 392 U.S., at 205, 
88 S.Ct., at 2028, and would therefore transgress the bounds of the authority granted Congress 
under the Commerce Clause.  While there are obvious differences between the schools and 
hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an 
integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions 
have traditionally afforded their citizens.  We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be 
overruled”).
115 U.S. CONST. Art VI, cl.2; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).  See also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 
452 (which avoided the question whether to extend commandeering to State judges by finding that 
absent “plain Statement” in law, federal age discrimination act cannot be applied to State judge s, 
and refusing to find such a Statement in the ADEA).
116 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (“where ... it is the whole object of the law to 
direct the functioning of the State executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of 
dual sovereignty, ... a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate”).
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Regards,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
I agree that defining sovereignty by referring to dignity isn’t of much help.  
It is, as you suggest, at some level about rules.  What else would a legal concept 
of sovereignty be?  Actually, Daniel Farber’s book, Lincoln’s Constitution, 
helpfully explores the question of federal/State sovereignty in its connection to 
secession and the Civil War.  His contends that there are at least three persistent 
variations on the theme of State sovereignty:  (1) President Abraham Lincoln’s 
and Senator Daniel Webster’s strongly nationalistic view that the union was 
created the very instant “we, the people” of the united colonies declared ourselves 
to be independent of the King of Great Britain, and that an undivided American 
people collectively ratified the present Constitution and created a fully sovereign 
national government; (2) a moderated, transformative view, under which the 
whole people created a government sovereign for some purposes but not for 
others—the States were connected for certain purposes prior to 1789, but retained 
their separate identities, which persisted in some form after ratification, and which 
persist weakly to this day; and (3) Senator John C. Calhoun’s strongly 
decentralized view that the States retained their full sovereignty after ratification 
because the Constitution was ratified by the people in their capacities as citizens 
of particular States, there is no undifferentiated American people and the States 
retain enormous constitutional significance as States.117
Fair enough.  Farber argues that “each of the three positions regarding 
sovereignty can find some support in the historical record.”118  “[T]he ambiguity 
of the historical record is more of a problem for staunch States’ rights advocates 
like Jefferson and Calhoun than for nationalists like Hamilton and Lincoln.”119
Why?  The “sweeping powers” of the government under the Constitution of 
1789.120 States’ rights advocates have to argue uphill.  Be that as it may, 
Jacksonian Democrats still “succeeded in paring federal activities to a bare 
minimum.”121  Thus, there is a political dimension to sovereignty talk.  Or, in our 
parlance, a substantive dimension.  “In practical terms,” Farber claims, “the key 
issue was not sovereignty but power.”122
117
 Daniel Farber, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 30-33 (University of Chicago Press 2003).
118
 Farber, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 43.
119
 Farber, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 44.
120 Id. (“Nationalists had to do little more than take the document at its word, with some added 
support from the Federalist Papers and from the early decisions of the Supreme Court”).
121 Id.
122 Id.
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And that’s it, isn’t it?  It’s not that sovereignty is metaphysical.  So is 
God’s existence, but surely that’s an important question.  It’s that sovereignty and 
its locus have political importance.  The federalist view was expressed strongly in 
Marbury and McCulloch.  Lots of pretty phrases about “we, the people” and the 
majesty of the Constitution.123 But I also have the sense that State sovereignty 
can be discussed with alternative political tropes, as an expression of a certain 
kind of democracy.  In many ways, the federal government is not especially 
democratic124—indeed, in Garcia the Supreme Court cites the undemocratic 
features of the federal Constitution, the Senate, the Electoral College, and the like, 
to proclaim that the federal political process adequately protects the States.  The 
federal Constitution structures the legislative process so that federal politicians 
must cater to geographic and economic interests.
The States, by contrast, have a k ind of democratic flavor.  “Dignity” talk 
casts the State legislatures as democratic in roughly the same way that 
parliamentary systems are supposed to be democratic—purely majoritarian.  The 
concept of representation at work is quite literal—it is what Hannah Pitkin called 
“descriptive representation.”125  The State government literally resembles the 
people, as the image in a mirror resembles a person.126 Thus, the dignity is the 
dignity of the very people.  No sophisticated layers of federalism, no Byzantine 
separation of powers, just majoritarianism.  Thus the literal indignity that, for 
conservatives, is heaped upon the people by the Supreme Court’s decision to 
strike down a law in the name of individual rights.  Controversial individual rights 
cases like Locke v. Davey127 and Lawrence v. Texas128 are federalism decisions 
every bit as much as Printz and Garcia, in the sense that in those cases the 
Supreme Court decides whether to impose federal constraints on State-level 
123 See generally Edmund S. Morgan, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:  THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (W.W. Norton 1988) (an incredibly insightful 
exploration of the history of the concept of popular sovereignty in the Anglo-American tradition).
124 See, e.g., Robert Dahl, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (Yale University 
Press 2003) (answer:  not very).
125 See generally Hanah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 60-91 (University of California 
1967) (discussing the concept of “descriptive representation” in which the government represents 
the people because it literally represents, or describes the people—obviously, this is not the 
concept of representation at work in the federal Constitution).
126
 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 72.
127 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding limitation for minister trainiing in Washington 
scholarship program in order to afford States give in “the joints” of Establishment Clause 
juriprudence).
128 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas’s criminal prohibition of 
homosexual sodomy on substantive due process grounds, without explcitily classifying a 
fundamental right).
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majoritarian decision-making.  Thus my fascination with Justice Chase’s 
ruminations in Calder v. Bull on the nature of republican government. 129
Justice Chase rejected what the partisans of State dignity embrace:  the 
idea that State government simp ly is majority rule in areas without federal 
preemption.  That is emphatically what the federal government is not.  One can 
State the matter in reverse:  are State governments bounded by enumeration, 
cabined by constitutional restrictions, and subject to federal imposition?130
Should they be?131  Or are they like imperfect Parliaments, with defeasibly 
complete legal supremacy?  My own thinking is that Justice Chase shouldn’t be 
cast aside.  His opinion in Calder is written in the language of the great 
constitutional cases:  Brown v. Board, Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, Cohen v. California, Roe v. Wade, Texas v. Johnson, Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, and Lawrence v. Texas.132  I think we should take Professor Randy 
Barnett’s libertarian critique133 of the very concept of unlimited police powers 
seriously, regardless of whether we accept it.
Majoritarian dignity doesn’t compel the holdings of many (if any) of the 
federalism cases,134 but it is an animating value.  Perhaps it provides a motivation
to read federal power narrowly because, given the extreme importance of vox 
populi, the framers and the ratifying population would never have wanted 
enumerated powers to extend to this or that area.  The dignitary concept of 
federalism is defined vaguely, that’s almost the point.  The vague rhetoric doesn’t 
control the growth of legal doctrine. Rather, it informs pedestrian forms of legal 
analysis.  In a certain light, the logic of the Eleventh Amendment cases works 
exactly like the logic of the Commerce Clause cases:  enumeration controls in one 
129 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (stating a view of unarticulated, natural law, limits on government action.); 
see note __, supra.
130
 Ironically, interposition might be the better term.
131
 We pause to note for those who embrace the Eleventh Amendment cases but reject the 
individual rights cases we have cited here that The Ninth Amendment can function as a hook for 
extratextual principles of individual liberty in the same manner as the Eleventh Amendment; it 
reads (“Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed ….”) exactly as the Eleventh Amendmnet 
does (“The judicial Power of the United States shall not be co nstrued ….”).  
132 Brown v. Bd. of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Griswold v. Connectucut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1981); Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
133 See Randy Barnett, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
(Princeton 2004).
134 Alden v. Maine is the most likely candidate.  The language of the Supremacy Clause seems 
clear (“… and the Judges in every State shall be bound [by the “Constitution and the Laws of the 
United States”], any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding”).  Presumably, State common law sovereign immunity against suit in State court 
is a “Thing in the … Laws of any State.”
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area, and the Eleventh Amendment’s gloss on Article III controls in the other.  
The Supreme Court’s federalism is one of form, not substance.
That said, I don’t know what to make of Printz.  I suspect, however, that 
you’re right.  To me, the case seems to be more about congressional overreaching 
than it is about abstract State sovereignty.  For that reason, Printz seems to me to 
be an aberration—judicial regulation of congressional hubris at the outer edges of 
generally plenary federal commerce power.  The core problem seems to me to be 
much larger—what is it around which Printz orbits?  The rationale behind Garcia
and Justice Blackmun’s rules-of-the-game approach is almost as much of a 
moving target as sovereignty.  It seems to me that the teaching of Garcia is that 
the presence of the States in the federal decision -making process insulates federal 
decisions from charges of tyranny, or heavy-handedness, in the administration of 
(assumedly legitimate) federal powers.  This plays on themes of procedural 
justice.135  It’s almost consideration or unconscionability. Congress can’t get 
more than it bargains for.
I think we’re approaching a kind of general theory of federalism.  Perhaps 
we can even explain the votes of a moderately conservative Justice, such as 
Justice Kennedy.  We can reimagine Lopez, Morrison, New York v. United States, 
and Printz, as cases in which Congress got more than it bargained for.  We can 
reimagine Garcia, Term Limits, and (perhaps) Raich as cases in which it did not.  
And to the extent I am troubled by Raich, it’s because I doubt that if Congress had 
to reenact the Controlled Substances Act today, it could do so without granting an 
exemption for intrastate medical marijuana use.  If the prohibition survives solely 
by inertia, without any input from the people in democratic fora—State or 
federal—then something has gone wrong.
Sincerely,
S.M.
IV.  PLAIN TALK:  CONGRESS’S DUTY TO SPEAK FOR THE PEOPLE
Steve,
Intriguing.  But I assume that you’re not proposing a doctrine to rival the 
Court’s holding in Raich.  It’s hard to see what that would be.  Rather, I take it 
you’re expressing discomfort with Conrgess’s exercise of its power rather than its 
existence—it’s almost like you’re saying something about the values implicit in 
135 See John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-90 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
1971), for an enlightening discussion of concepts of procedural justice in the context of Rawls’s 
earlier thinking on equality of opportunity.
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the Presentment Clause.136  I gather from what you’re saying that you approve of 
sunset provisions. When something’s in doubt, put it up for a vote.  
I think there are cases that support what you’re saying in the federalism 
context.  There’s the clear statement rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft.137  The same is 
true of the similar rules of Edelman v. Jordan and Atascadero State Hospital v. 
Scanlon.138  Also think about the recent decision in Gonzales v. Oregon.139
Technically, it’s about administrative law. In 2001, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft promulgated a regulation stating that prescribing certain Schedule II 
controlled substances for the purpose of assisting a terminally ill patient to end his 
or her life is not a “legitimate medical purpose” within the meaning of the detailed 
federal statutes and regulations that permit licensed physicians to prescribe 
controlled substances.140 Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act was enacted by a 
voter initiative in 1994.141  It proscribes certain procedures under which Oregon 
physicians may lawfully distribute or prescribe, but not administer, the same 
drugs.142  Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court refused to show deference to 
the Attorney General’s interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act or pre-
existing federal regulations,143 but also addressed the substance of the Attorney 
General’s interpretation of the statute.144
Justice Kennedy stated unequivocally that Congress could preempt 
Oregon’s law,145 but argued that the Controlled Substances Act “manifests no 
intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.”146  Better still, Justice 
Kennedy stated:
Just as the conventions of expression indicate that Congress is unlikely to 
alter a statute’s obvious scope and division of authority through muffled 
hints, the background principles of our federal system also belie the notion 
136 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of 
the United States; he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it ….”); see Clinton, 524 
U.S. at 417.
137 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452 (absent “plain Statement” in federal law, federal age 
discrimination act can't be applied to State judges ).
138 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 651.
139 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
140 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 913, 915, 918.
141 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 912.
142 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 912-13.
143 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 914-922 (discussing whether to provide deference under Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452 (1997) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984) and deciding to extend no deference).
144 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 922.
145 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 923.
146 Id; Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 939 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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that Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority to regulate 
areas traditionally supervised by the State’s police power.  It is 
unnecessary even to consider the application of clear statement 
requirements, [citations omitted] or presumptions against preemption, 
[citations omitted] to reach this commonsense conclusion.147
It’s hard to pin down that this means.  The Ninth Circuit cited Gregory to impose 
a clear statement requirement on the Attorney General.148  And it’s also worth 
noting that at one point “[l]egislation was … introduced to grant the explicit 
authority” that Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales asserted against Oregon, 
“but it failed to pass.”149
What does Oregon mean?  It’s impossible to say with any precision.  But 
it seems that something like your discomfort with politicians’ free riding off of 
pre-existing preemption is alive and well on the Court.
Enthused,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson, 
You raise an excellent point.  But the result wasn’t the same in the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in the internet winery case, Granholm v. Heald, 
where the Supreme Court struck down State winery regulations under the dormant 
Commerce Clause .150 Federal law preempted State law without Congress having 
to make any statement, much less a plain one.  Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion 
in that case, too.151  I’ll grant that the Commerce Clause plainly puts some limits 
on the States’ police powers .  And these core limits should be enforced whether 
Congress speaks to the issue or not.  But this is really a very narrow category of 
cases—State action inconsistent with the existen ce of the Commerce Clause.  
Perhaps even the union more generally.  Indeed, something like this principle has
been affirmed in other areas of the law—most dramatically when the Supreme 
Court struck down California’s “anti-Okie” law in Edwards v. California.152
147 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 925.
148 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 914 (quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (in turn 
quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460)).
149 Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 913.
150 Granholm v. Heald 125 S.Ct. 1885 (2005).
151 Granholm, 125 S.Ct. at 1895 (he argued that “[t]he rule prohibiting State discrimination against 
interState commerce follows … from the principle that States should not be compelled to 
negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored status for their own citizens,” and that 
“[s]tates do not need, and may not attempt, to negotiate with other States regarding their mutual 
economic interests”).
152 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 
249 U.S. 511, 523); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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A discriminatory rule against interstate migration presents an easy case.  
The harder questions are of degree and extent—where to draw the line in the 
average Commerce Clause case.  I suspect that here, too, the answer lies in 
Garcia.  In most cases, Garcia should put the burden on Congress legislate if it 
wants to preempt unwise State regulation.  Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s opinion in 
Maine v. Taylor153 is very much in this vein.  In Taylor, the Supreme Court 
upheld an outright ban on the importation of live, out-of-State baitfish in Maine ; 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court rested largely on the theory that Maine 
had legitimate concerns about the potential for foreign fish to introduce 
previously unknown diseases and parasites into Maine’s domestic stock.154  “Not 
all intentional barriers to interstate trade”, he argued, “are protectionist … and the 
Commerce Clause ‘is not a guaranty of the right to import into a State whatever 
one may please, absent a prohibition by Congress, regardless of the effects of the 
importation upon the local community.’”155  That’s the key, isn’t it?  Surely the 
State’s interest matters, but there’s a structural point to be made.  Congress 
unquestionably could defeat Maine’s ban, but until Congress legislates Maine 
“retains its broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its 
citizens and the integrity of its natural resources.”156  And if Congress wants to 
displace Maine’s environmental policy, it should put it up for a vote. 157
Justice Stevens, very much in the mode of muddying sovereignty,
dissented in Maine v. Taylor; though he disclaimed any motive “to derogate the 
State's interest in ecological purity,” he argued that “the State … should be put to 
its proof,” and “the invocation of environmental protection or public health has 
never been thought to confer some kind of special dispensation from the general 
principle of nondiscrimination in interstate commerce.”158  That is consistent with 
our reading of Raich.
So while I must confess that personally my sympathies lie with the winery 
owners in Granholm, it’s clear to me that the Supreme Court’s holding in that 
case takes the pressure off Congress to hold a vote on winery regulation.  In fact, 
the decision exercises federal power in a fairly opaque way.  Congress actually 
has to authorize a State to enact laws that intentionally discriminate against out-
153 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 
(1978) for an earlier discussion of similar issues.
154 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137-38.
155 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 149, n19 (quoting Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 458 (1946)).
156 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151.
157
 This is hardly a new concept. See Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 699 (1880); and id. at 
701 (discussing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299 (1851)).
158 Maine v. Taylor  477 U.S. 131, 152-153 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)  (emphasis added; 
paragraph break omitted).
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of-State commerce, unless the State asserts a powerful interest.159 And when 
Congress actually wants to preempt such laws, it gets to do so for free. 160
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
Clever debating strategy.  You know my sympathies for Harry Blackmun 
opinions.161  I can’t for the life of me understand why Garcia has fallen out of 
favor.  Garcia was one of his best opinions, and has much significance here, for it 
reinforces the fact that Congress has the exclusive Commerce Power and the 
States can participate in its exercise.  But Justice Blackmun was but one Justice, 
and he is, sadly, no longer on the Court.  So, my question to you is:  does the 
Gonzales v. Oregon and Maine v. Taylor theory of federalism have any life left in 
it on the modern Supreme Court? Granted, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
are blank slates in this regard.  But aside from undisciplined tealeaf reading about 
159 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 140 (“Maine's ban on the importation of live baitfish thus is 
constitutional only if it satisfies the requirements ordinarily applied under Hughes v. Oklahoma[, 
441 U.S. 322 (1979),] to local regulation that discriminates against interState trade: the statute 
must serve a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose must be one that cannot be served as well 
by available nondiscriminatory means”); Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (“The crucial inquiry … 
must be directed to determining whether [the statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or 
whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon 
interState commerce that are only incidental”); cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) 
(“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its 
effects on interState commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.  Huron Portland 
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 80 S.Ct. 813, 816, 4 L.Ed.2d 852.  If a 
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree”).
160
 And what Congress gets can be valuable indeed.  Consider Justice Souter’s similar arguments 
about local rights in another environmental case, C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 
383, 421 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556), where he dissented 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in that case to strike down a law establishing municipally 
owned waste collection and providing it with special rights.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s arguments 
in his dissent in the Healy case have much the same ring, West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 
U.S. 186, 216-217 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.) (quoting New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
focused on the notion of comity, in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality 
of State of Or. 511 U.S. 93, 111-12 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.), 
where the Supreme Court invalidated yet another solid waste regulation.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s point is well taken:  if comity means anything, it means not treating your neighbor as 
a garbage heap.
161
 Professor Bezanson worked as a law clerk for Justice Harry A. Blackmun in October Term 
1972 (1972-73).  He and Justice Blackmun maintained strong ties long after Professor Bezanson 
left his position as a clerk.
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the larger story of Gonzales v. Oregon, can we learn anything from the other 
Justices?
Curious,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
Well, there’s Justice Thomas.  He concurred in the judgment in the recent 
American Trucking Associations case, where the Supreme Court upheld a $100 
fee Michigan levies on intrastate commercial trucking under the Commerce 
Clause.162  He argued that “‘[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the 
text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in 
application,’ ... and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a 
State statute.”163  Justice Scalia is somewhat more restrained.  He concurred In 
West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, where the Supreme Court struck down a 
Massachusetts program under which the State collected mandatory fees from all 
sellers of milk in Massachusetts (some of whom were not from Massachusetts) for 
a fund to be distributed to all producers of milk in Massachusetts (all of whom 
were from Massachusetts).164 Justice Scalia conceded that the Commerce Clause 
was written “to create a national market,” but he argued that “[i]t does not follow 
from that … that every State law which obstructs a national market violates the 
Commerce Clause.  Yet that is what the Court says [in Healy],” and “ … this 
expansive view of the Commerce Clause calls into question a wide variety of 
State laws that have hitherto been thought permissible,” including purely 
monetary subsidies.165  Justice Scalia therefore announced that he “will, on stare 
decisis grounds, enforce a self-executing ‘negative’ Commerce Clause in two 
situations: (1) against a State law that facially discriminates against interstate
commerce, and (2) against a State law that is indistinguishable from a type of law 
previously held unconstitutional by this Court.”166  And thus Scalia strives to 
162 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 125 S.Ct. 2419 (2005); id. at 2426 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment).
163 Id. (citations omitted).
164 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
165 Healy, 512 U.S. at 207-208 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id., at 211-12 (footnote omitted)  
(“I would therefore allow a State to subsidize its domestic industry so long as it does so from 
nondiscriminatory taxes that go into the State's general revenue fund. Perhaps, as some 
commentators contend, that line comports with an important economic reality:  A State is less 
likely to maintain a subsidy when its citizens perceive that the money (in the general fund) is 
available for any number of competing, nonprotectionist, purposes”).  We assume that we may 
ignore the subsidy effects of the market participant doctrine, see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 
429 (1980), for the purposes of Justice Scalia’s concurrence.  See also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 125 
S.Ct. at 2426 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, citing to his Healy opinion).
166 Healy, 512 U.S. at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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“produce a clear rule that honors the holdings of our past decisions but declines to 
extend the rationale that produced those decisions any further.”167
Granted, Justices Scalia and Thomas haven’t embraced our broad, vague, 
and mushy preference for clear statements.  But there’s something attractive about 
the transparency involved in their arguments, isn’t there?   When you think about 
this position alongside his Raich concurrence, Justice Scalia is consistent—he 
rejects a broad dormant Commerce Clause and embraces a theoretically robust 
(and doctrinally sound) view of Commerce Clause power.  I also think that Justice
Kennedy wins a prize for consistency—he’s has somewhat consistently 
elaborated his views on divided sovereignty.168
One could argue that Congress’s power affirmatively to regulate national 
life through Article I, section 8 may be distinguished from, and should receive 
different treatment than, Congress’s power under the same Clause negatively to 
displace obnoxious State regulations.  This seems to me, however, to be a 
distinction without a difference.  To justify such an assumption, one must assume 
that Congress is simply not to be trusted with economic stewardship of the 
nation,169 or that somehow Article I, section 8 is a grant of power to the Supreme 
Court rather than to Congress.
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
Maybe.  I’m troubled, though.  It’s almost like we have dueling default 
rules in the opinions.  Perhaps we can State the problem as follows:  unless the 
self-executing Commerce Clause is a default rule to which Congress has to give 
special exceptions (Justices Scalia and Thomas reject the principle outright, and 
surely Justice Stevens doesn’t mean to embrace it), there has to be a mechanism 
for resolving conflicts.  But it doesn’t appear that Stevens has one, aside from the 
somewhat unhelpful proposition that the presumption must be toward the 
invalidity of discriminatory regulation.  But transparency aside, I think the same 
goes for the conservatives.  They adopt the opposite default rule.  This isn’t very 
helpful because when there is no discrimination on the face a State statute (where 
167
 Id. (citations omitted).
168 With respect to Justice Kennedy, see, e.g., Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty”); Granholm v. Heald  125 S.Ct. at 1885;
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169
 Or, perhaps more precisely, not to be trusted not to resist the temptation to save political capital 
and garner political points in the States by refusing to displace State political settlements already 
won.  Admittedly, Congress is the birthplace of collective action problems.  Structural collective 
action problems, if proved to exist for a particular issue or range of issues, might change the 
analysis and justify Supreme Court intervention.  An argument would need to be offered up, 
however, to show why this issue is different from that or most issues.
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the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test applies170), the question of the police 
power is not squarely presented.  The Pike test is deferential to the States.  But 
where the law is discriminatory, the State is asserting one of its sovereign powers.  
There’s a conflict here that has to be resolved somehow.  And I hope there’s more 
to ask than whether the State interest is important and whether it can be served by 
nondiscriminatory means.171
Before we move on, let me try to get to the bottom of these issues.  First, 
let me try to restate briefly your analysis and interpretation, with some 
extrapolation of my own, perhaps. Negative Commerce Clause doctrine is both 
incoherent in many settings, especially beyond discrimination against interstate
commerce.  And, more importantly, it lacks textual or theoretical justification in 
the Constitution.  It doesn’t explain why State regulations that  discriminate against 
or interfere with the national market should be (presumptively?) unconstitutional, 
either in terms of the States’ governing authority (I prefer that to “sovereignty”, 
which I deem a pretty useless term) or in terms of Congress’s exclusive and 
enumerated power.  The effect of broad judicial intervention is to cut Congress, 
the power-holder, out of the circle.  And this is justified partly on the ground that 
Congress (these days) is not in a position to act.  But Courts can. 
In the abstract, at least, this is a remarkable and structurally destructive 
tautology.  An alternative view, voiced in our exchange by Justice Blackmun, 
shifts the presumption of unconstitutionality in cases involving (here I generalize 
the view, which rests heavily on the environmental interests of States) a State’s 
political actions designed to protect the health and welfare interests of its citizens 
even if the effect of such actions interferes with the national market and/or 
disproportionately burdens interstate commerce.  In such cases the State is 
exercising its police power—governing in the health and welfare interests of its 
population—which it is entitled to, and indeed must, do under the federal system 
established by the Constitution—de facto, not de jure.
Judicial preemption of such State regulations is unjustified for man y 
possible reasons:  (a) because the Judicial Branch does not have such broad 
Commerce Power; (b) because in doing so it invades the State’s sovereignty, 
dignity, or, as I prefer, its practically essential governing power; (c) because 
judges don’t have the knowledge or capacity to decide such “interference” 
questions and weigh the State’s policies (or even ascertain them); or (d) because it 
cuts the federal legislative process out, making political compromises and 
settlements unlikely because the Court has already settled the matter.
It is the last point that’s most interesting.  Garcia suggests that negative 
Commerce Clause doctrine is not only cutting Congress out, but preempting a 
structural and valuable element of the Constitutional system that safeguards State
170 Pike, 397 U.S. at 137; see note 159, supra.
171 See authorities cited in note 159, supra.
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interests.  To state our point briefly:  the States’ structural protections —
opportunities for individual or collective defense of their interests in the 
Constitutional scheme—require legislative action at the federal level, 
accompanied by the procedural and substantive protections of States in that 
process (bicameralism,172 nondelegation,173 limits on federal administrative 
action,174 presentment,175 representation in the Senate for States, 176 and the like).  
If the judicial branch would stay out of most negative implications conflicts, the 
issues presented by State regulation could, if deemed important to federal 
interests, be taken up and negotiated with the States’ participation in the House 
and Senate and the White House, the Constitutional loci of the pow er to regulate 
commerce among the States. 
I find this view much more satisfying than appeals to “federalism” or 
“sovereignty.” It seems that every Justice has his or her own definition or 
intuition about federalism, from very little (Stevens, Ginsburg) to some (Kennedy, 
O’Connor) to everything (Thomas), with others lurking in the cracks.  And I like 
your view’s location in Garcia and the structural and procedural, rather than the 
substantive, language of Constitutional doctrine. 
But questions abound.  What is the counterpoint, if any, in Commerce 
Clause doctrine, to such a structural understanding from negative Commerce 
Clause doctrine?  Here are some thoughts.  In Commerce Clause doctrine, 
enumeration is the limit. But substantive justifications have always found their 
way into the analysis (federalism, State sovereign interests, etc.) because 
enumeration-based formulaic limits, by themselves, can’t stand without a 
background—presently vaguely substantive177—explanation.  One answer is that 
Garcia is the limit here, too:  process alone is the key, and as long as Congress 
follows the prescribed process (with its implications for cutting back on 
delegation, restricting executive lawmaking power, etc.), it can do what it wants.  
Indeed, Justice Souter made this very argument in Morrison, rooting his analysis 
in Garcia and the Seventeenth Amendment.178  Yet that seems a bit unsatisfying 
172 Chada, 462 U.S. at 919; see also Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the 
Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
173
 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L.Rev. 303, 336 (1999).
174 E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006); see notes 139-49, supra.
175 Clinton (The Line Item Veto Case), 524 U.S. at 417.
176 U.S. CONST., Art. V (“… no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it’s [sic] equal 
Suffrage in the Senate”).
177 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-616 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-79 (Kennedy, J, 
concurring)); see not 17, supra.
178
 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 649-52 (Souter, J., dissenting), arguing, among other things, that the 
Seventeenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. Amdt. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years ….”) and 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. at 528, altered the constitutional calculus, 
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and incomplete.  As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Congress is not a 
Parliament.179  But without resort to “federalism” and “sovereignty,” there are 
alternative and narrower substantive limits:  the words “commerce” and “among 
the States.”  As to these things, the Judicial Branch can perhaps justify its judicial 
review power—a substantive terms-defining power, but not broader “federalism-” 
and “sovereignty-” based creative power.  Raich seems very much to respect such 
a distinction, even if its holding isn’t clear on the face of the Court’s opinions.  
Is the presence of such limited judicial power in the Commerce Clause 
setting the counterpart to the discrimination-line power exercised by the Court, 
and accepted by Scalia, in the negative commerce cases?  Perhaps so.  Such a 
view clearly makes some sense.  But if so, what does the permissible reach of 
judicially-enforced negative Commerce Clause limits consists of?  It surely can’t 
consist of “federalism,” or all is lost in the symetrical analysis.  And I doubt that it 
can consist of a definition of the “police power,” which really defies definition 
and in any event is not stated or conferred in the Constitution. 
Here’s a thought.  Instead of police power (or perhaps in recognition, but 
not constitutionalization, of it) the limit of State power is that a State may not 
exercise the commerce power in Article I, section 8, because the commerce power 
is exclusive.  That’s the flip side of what Chief Justice Marshall said in the 
passage you’ve quoted from Gibbons.  When can it be said that the State is 
exercising the commerce power? Certainly not in the instance you draw from 
Taylor.  There, commerce is affected, even changed, but the aim of the law or 
regulation is purely local and undoubtedly a bona fide exercise of the State’s 
governing (police) power.  This is so even if the regulation overtly discriminates 
against out of State commerce.  But some regulations discriminate against out of 
State commerce with no other possible interest than giving State interests a 
commercial advantage over out of State interests —economic protectionism, in 
itself, is the means employed to achieve other putative interests which themselves 
are commercial—the milk cases versus quarantines to protect livestock from 
disease.180 Such laws are unconstitutional unless Congress expressly adopts them 
as its own.
I’m not certain that this works as an explanation of the cases, but if it or 
some variant of the idea does work, it can set the boundary between valid and 
invalid State laws at the (judicially manageable) definitional level of whether the 
State is exercising the exclusive commerce power, rather than make it turn on 
whether federalism or sovereignty interests have been violated or insensitively 
and, in effect, remanded federalism disputes to the court of politics.  Indeed, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s argument that Congress should be understood emphatically not to be like Parliament, 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616, n7; see note 33, supra, was made in response to this point.
179 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616, n7.
180 See, e.g. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 131.
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balanced.  The federalism and sovereignty interests, instead, have been reflected 
in the balance struck in the Commerce Clause, as we have similarly suggested for 
the commerce power itself.  More broadly we might posit that the sovereignty or 
federalism interests in much (all?) of the Constitution have been already balanced 
in the structural protections surrounding the exercise of federal power, a’la 
Garcia. 
So much for federalism at large; there is no “brooding omnipresence in the 
sky.”181  Federal supremacy means federal supremacy, not some larger theory of 
dual sovereignty that might, in a better world, prohibit commandeering and 
unfunded mandates.  What are the implications of our emerging, largely practical 
and non-ideological, approach to “federalism” and “sovereignty” concepts in the 
Constitution?  It seems to me that (1) the methodologies employed by both camps 
in the Term Limits opinion were erroneous, as no overarching principles about the 
source of power can or should be divined, must less applied, in the Constitution or 
its history (and, it may be added, neither overarching principle really resolved the 
issue in the case, which would be better addressed by text and history at the retail
level); and (2) the operable conception of the Constitutional system was a 
melange of varying ideas and practical realities and known uncertainties that lay 
ahead, borne by, I suspect, a deep suspicion of “pure” theory, as acted out in the 
French Revolution.182
Federalism is an interpretive device, but not a freestanding one.  Of the 
two models with which we began this exchange, we’re closer to model (2), the 
enumerated powers independent State model, but we’re not entirely divorced
from the spirit of model (1).  We’ve seen that substantive theories of federalism 
and sovereignty have little explanatory force when we approach the document at 
any significant level of specificity.  You keep reiterating your adherence to a 
complex, multilayered theory of sovereignty, but in law a theory of sovereignty 
that refers to everything governs nothing.  Vague sovereignty has no specific 
meaning, except in one sense.  It pushes us to see the Constitution is a rules-of-
the-game document, a practical guide to representative government in a layered, 
federal, system produced by a political consensus that had pre-digested the 
varying strands of intellectual thought at the time.  It is not a script intended to 
evoke and enliven judicial resort to larger political or philosophical ideas such as 
“federalism” or “sovereignty.”
181 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common 
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi 
sovereign that can be identified; although some decisions with which I have disagreed seem to me 
to have forgotten the fact”).
182
 Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent 12-25 (1975). Discussion Edmund Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).
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We need to think about the implications of generalizing this approach. Its 
value (as well as risk) would be experimentation (part of O’Connor’s tetherless
federalism in Raich); its justification, as with the Commerce Clause, would be 
enumeration and what it implies—the necessary resort to the structured political 
process to work out solutions if they are deemed necessary at the federal level.
Regards,
R.B.
V.  UNION REVISITED
Professor Bezanson,
Well, let’s not be too hasty.  Maybe we can take another look at the idea of 
the union.  It seems to matter to the Justices.  In Granholm, Justice Kennedy put 
forward the odd assertion that the prohibition on outright interstate discrimination 
“is essential to the foundations of the Union.  The mere fact of nonresidence 
should not foreclose a producer in one State from access to markets in other 
States.”183 Rhetoric about the union is a commonplace in the dormant Commerce 
Clause cases.184  But the rhetoric of union must be the beginning rather than the 
end of the inquiry.  Obviously, some federally-imposed limitations on State
regulatory powers are logically essential to the existence of the union.  The 
Supreme Court can surely enforce sweeping preemption of State action without 
Congress’s approval if alternative is political collapse and economic and military 
ruin—the very reasons for the Constitution’s existence.185  But except for State-
183 Granholm 125 S.Ct. at 1895.
184 E.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 
336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
185 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 223-224 (1824) (Johnson, J.) (“The strong sympathies … which bound 
the States together during a common war, dissolved on the return of peace; and the very principles 
which gave rise to the war of the revolution, began to threaten the confederacy with anarchy and 
ruin.  The States had resisted a tax imposed by the parent State, and now reluctantly submitted to, 
or altogether rejected, the moderate demands of the confederation.  Every one recollects the 
painful and threatening discussions, which arose on the subject of the five per cent. duty.  Some 
States rejected it altogether; others insisted on collecting it themselves; scarc ely any acquiesced 
without reservations, which deprived it altogether of the character of a national measure; and at 
length, some repealed the laws by which they had signified their acquiescence.  For a century the 
States had submitted, with murmurs, to th e commercial restrictions imposed by the parent State; 
and now, finding themselves in the unlimited possession of those powers over their own 
commerce, which they had so long been deprived of, and so earnestly coveted, that selfish 
principle which, well controlled, is so salutary, and which, unrestricted, is so unjust and tyrannical, 
guided by inexperience and jealousy, began to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic 
measures, from which grew up a conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of 
the States, and fatal to their commercial interests abroad. This was the immediate cause, that led to 
the forming of a convention” (paragraph breaks removed; this appears as three paragraphs in 
original)); see also Id., at 224-225.
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imposed barriers to interstate travel and migration,186 State negotiation of treaties 
and trade agreements with other States or with foreign nations ,187 nullification and 
interposition,188 secession,189 and the like, that principle doesn’t compel many
specific limitations on the State power.  
Let me recast the question—we’re defining State regulatory authority in 
the shadow of federal power.  We’re looking for a definition of the police power, 
which can be thought of the sum total of State regulatory powers left over after 
their abrogation by self-executing constitutional provisions and constitutionally 
enacted federal statutes.  Chief Justice Taney defined this constellation of powers 
in the language of territorial sovereignty in Thurlow v. Massachusetts190:
But what are the police powers of a State?  They are nothing more or less 
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent 
of its dominions.  [It is] … the power to govern men and things within the 
limits of its dominion.  It is by virtue of this power that it legislates; and its 
authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to 
pass health laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by the 
constitution of the United States. 191
But this is deeply question-begging.  The real question is how tightly the 
Constitution “restrict[s]” the powers of the States.  According to Chief Justice 
Taney “it necessarily follows that the grant of power to the federal government is 
not an absolute and entire prohibition to the States, but merely confers upon 
Congress the superior and controlling power.”192  But this is to State the same 
problem in different words.  The scope of the “superior and controlling power” 
186 See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174; see also Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489; cited in note 152, supra.
187 Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios  181 F.3d 38, 61-71 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that 
Massachusetts law directing State agencies not to conduct business with companies that trade with 
Burma was preempted by the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause), aff’d on other grounds Crosby 
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council  530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that Massachusetts law directing 
State agencies not to conduct business with companies that  trade with Burma was preempted by 
federal trade sanctions regime).
188 U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
189
 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691 
(Spring 2004) (referring to the Civil War as “Grant v. Lee”); id. at 693, 727, n4 (“When once 
before I made oblique reference, with irony, to the ‘case’ of Grant v Lee (Appomattox Court 
House 1865) in a footnote to an academic article, the law review editors asked me to provide a 
case reporter citation, as they had not been able to find it on Westlaw or Lexis”).
190
 46 U.S. 504 (1847).
191 Thurlow, 46 U.S. at 583.
192 Thurlow, 46 U.S. at 583; see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-360, (1943); id., 317 
U.S. at 589; Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. 456, 471 (1874).
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and the question whether it should be politically or judicially enforced are the 
heart of the matter.   
We’ve really got to think about what it means to have concurrent powers 
and dual sovereignty.  The idea of concurrent powers is certainly familiar.  The 
Supreme Court has seen regulatory powers over commerce as inherently 
concurrent since the 1820s; Gibbons v. Ogden made the point in reference to 
concurrent State and federal powers of taxation, concluding that no logical or 
legal paradox emerges by the concession that both the States and the union can 
tax (and tax heavily) the same activity.193 Chief Justice Marshall suggested that 
this issue emerges from the very form of our government:
In our complex system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one 
general government, whose action extends over the whole, but which 
possesses only certain enumerated powers; and of numerous State
governments, which retain and exercise all powers not delegated to the 
Union, contests respecting power must arise.  Were it even otherwise, the 
measures taken by the respective governments to execute their 
acknowledged powers, would often be of the same description, and might, 
sometimes, interfere.  This, however, does not prove that the one is 
exercising, or has a right to exercise, the powers of the other.194
It’s the last sentence that’s key.  I think the implicit suggestion is that Sta te and 
federal power should be analyzed as distinct phenomena.  As we have said several 
times, the separate governments’ powers are, and should remain, conceptually 
separate. State and federal powers do not flow from the same source.  The zenith 
of one is not the nadir of the other.
But if that’s true then many things follow.  First, something more than a 
definition is needed to show that the police power necessarily unlimited outside 
the area of federal preemption.  Second, the Blackmun-esque view of complex 
and layered sovereignty, as in Garcia, with many actors speaking in different 
voices at different times, and/or the Kennedy-esque view of dual sovereignty, 
with State and federal actors each taking different and overlapping parts of the 
original powers delegated by “we, the people” become much more attractive.
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
193 Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1, 198-200 (1824).
194 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 204-205 (1824); see also Thurlow v. Com. Of Mass., 46 U.S. 504, 
578-79 (Taney, C.J.).
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I find your idea of accommodation even in the preemption setting to be 
very interesting, and certainly of a piece with the larger idea.  In the Oregon case, 
however, we needn’t go so far.  The federal Controlled Substances Act exempts 
use of the otherwise prohibited or regulated drugs if they are sold or administered 
pursuant to a physician’s prescription for treatment that meets reasonable medical 
standards.195  The Oregon law does not violate the act, Oregon argued, because 
Oregon has passed a law that alters the licensing and medical practice standards 
set, traditionally and today, by the states.196 The federal government’s argument 
was that the new medical standards set by Oregon do not satisfy the Controlled 
Substances Act, not because the act specifically outlaws assisted suicide by doctor 
and patient at the very end of life, but because the federal government has some 
general authority via the Attorney General to decide whether medical standards in 
states are acceptable in light of the law enforcement purposes of the Act.197  This 
is a general, and largely administrative and law enforcement authority.198  It is not 
an express federal power going to the specific drug(s) used in specific ways 
authorized under the Oregon law.  This makes the case different from Raich
because there were no exceptions of this kind for the sale of marijuana and the 
California law in any event didn’t limit itself (or perhaps even deal with) the 
practice of medicine issues.
Thus Gonzales is much closer to the pure negative implications cases, and 
so Oregon can make the more straightforward negative implications-type 
argument on behalf of state legislative power in the absence of congressional 
action under Art. I, section 8.  This is an argument that would be greatly 
strengthened by a recognized claim that when a state acts within its traditional 
police powers and in the absence of economically protectionist discrimination 
against interstate commerce, the national market interests and solutions rest not 
with courts, but with Congress and the President exercising legislative powers 
under Articles I and II.
Sincerely,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
I think you give us too little credit.  While decided on grounds of 
deference (lack of it, actually) to the Attorney General's rulemaking power under 
federal law, the Gonzales decision rests on an expressed background of traditional 
state lawmaking, and by disallowing the Attorney Generals’s power under the 
195 See note 140, and accompanying text, supra.
196 See note 142, and accompanying text, supra.
197 See note 140, and accompanying text, supra.
198 Id.
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federal law it puts the matter back into Congress’s lap where the States can launch 
a full and fair fight under the Garcia principles.
Genially,
S.M.
Steve,
If that is true, then it seems, as a general matter, that we have settled on 
something very practical.  We see “federalism” not as a theory and legal doctrine, 
but instead as a set of obstacles in the field of government power.  To stretch the 
sports metaphor, these posts and barriers prevent any of the contestants from
running the field, and serve as brakes or required resting points at which the 
contestants must count to ten and think carefully about what they are doing.  The 
hope is to slow the brutality and engender, to the extent possible, cooperation and 
compromise and constructive competition.  
So there is no grand Constitutional federalism that stands as an 
unbreachable chasm between state and federal power.  There is, really, no 
schematic of “sovereignty” that can be usefully drawn upon.  In a very American 
way, I think, sovereignty was quite decisively dispensed with as a term used, 
much less enforced, in the internal governance and affairs of the nation.  The 
nation was sovereign among nations, but not within itself.  This would mean, of 
course (if we are right), that the Supreme Court has profoundly miscalculated the 
nature of the Constitution’s structural design.  There is no “brooding 
omnipresence.”199  There is no architect and no controlling philosophy.  There is 
instead an imperfect and therefore malleable, immensely practical, and basically 
non-theoretical set of rules with which to govern a republic committed to 
democratic participation and the powerful idea of freedom and personal liberty.  
No absolutes.  No precincts of unreviewable power.  No corners free of healthy 
competition.  Nothing too tidy.
In terms of the instances of “federalism” upon which the Supreme Court 
has lately focused its attention, what have we?  We have a clear governing rule of 
enumeration at the federal level, which many say has served as a means of 
aggrandizement of federal power through the commerce and spending powers.200
But we find no mention of “federalism” in Article I, section 8.  No high theory.  
Instead we find an untidy and imperfect set of enumerated powers which 
necessarily change over time—in degree but not in kind. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, with its reading of enumeration and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not easily confined.  There is nothing wrong with 
the Supreme Court trying to tweak it and shore it up, as in Lopez and Morrison.  
But the bludgeon of federalism, of separate and sealed “fields” of authority for the 
199 Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
200 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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federal government and for the states, simply won’t do.  It can’t work, for the 
bread of enumeration isn’t sliced along substantive lines.  More importantly, it 
isn’t what was put in the Constitution.  Enumeration is a practical and very 
important obstacle, a place to count to ten and give second thought.  And a place 
to make certain that the other structural brakes—the Garcia rules of state 
participation, bicameralism, presentment, constrained delegation, and the like—
are fully and fairly in place.
The Court should see other constitutional provisions and rules in a similar 
way.  The Eleventh Amendment, for example, shouldn’t be seen as a spare text 
engorged by federalism and sovereignty.  Sovereignty and its conceit, dignity, 
have no place in the operative doctrines of the Constitution.  Instead Article III’s 
jurisdictional rules and the Eleventh Amendment’s limits should be seen as 
practical instruments for protecting against the bankruptcy of government itself 
and from the subjugation of one government by the threat of economic ruin by the 
other.  These are practical ideas that allow textual and practical legal rules, and 
that allow a healthy measure of flexibility for future adjustment (Ex Parte Young, 
for example) if wielded by a reasoned hand in obedience to other structural rules 
of limited judicial power or legislative process.
Two other constitutional provisions deserve mention here.  The first is the
qualifications provision of Article I.  That provision needn’t, and in our view 
shouldn’t, be seen as a font of sovereignty, a term not used in the Constitution, 
borne at the creation.  The remarkable conceptual and historical exercises played 
out by, among others, Justices Stevens and Thomas, are neither provable or 
usefully operable in law.  It seems clear to us that the people of the states voted in 
their states to express their agreement on the creation of a government of the 
people of the nation. 
Finally, a surprisingly broad array of the federalism rules are non-textual, 
which is to say that they are of the Court’s own creation.  This is most obviously 
true of the intergovernmental immunities doctrines, which have ebbed and flowed 
for over a century.  It is true also of the most recent arrival in the immunities 
family, the commandeering rule prohibiting the federal government from using 
states as lawmaking, enforcing, and judicial agents of federal will.  These sets of 
doctrines can be seen in two ways.  The first, the Supreme Court’s, looks at them 
as protections for the states’ dignity and sovereign separateness.  The second way 
of looking at the doctrines is that the Court, extra-textually but perhaps for good 
reason, has created them as practically necessary obstacles to aggrandizement.  
The latter is obviously our view.  Under that view there is nothing wrong with the 
Court’s creativity if the rules allow for flexibility.  If they were absolute they 
would then become barriers in the name of state authority and not obstacles 
requiring occasions for sober political reflection.  The bright-line absolutism of 
the commandeering doctrine, then, is misplaced.
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The need for judicially crafted practical obstacles flexibly enforced to 
accommodate the occasional conflicts between the federal government and the 
States is, in its best sense, reflected in the judiciary’s own rules of abstention and 
comity.201  Abstention is, at base, a practical and functional set of rules by which a 
state court’s greater ability to adjudicate certain local or complex regulatory 
issues is taken advantage of, but not at the expense (as opposed to delay) of 
opportunity for federal court jurisdiction over the federal issues.  Comity likewise 
respects states’ law enforcement powers as well as the Supremacy Clause 
obligation imposed on state courts by the Constitution, by deferring federal court 
review of federal claims until completion of the state criminal prosecution, absent 
specific reasons to distrust the state court’s willingness to obey federal law.  But 
the comity doctrine is not textually compelled, as opposed to textually informed.  
It is not fixed.  It has expanded beyond criminal prosecutions.202  And it has 
exceptions built into it—occasions for calm reflection.  It is thus of a piece with 
the adjustments of federal and state claims of power occasioned by a judicially-
created obstacle, but not a barrier.
A last lesson, this one a message to the judicial branch when exercising 
federal power, comes from the negative implications cases.  There we see that 
encroachment by judicial supervision of state laws has effectively sheltered 
Congress from its constitutional responsibility to enact legislation preserving a 
national economy when it judges that local state laws serving local purposes have 
excessively disrupted its own view of the desired national market.  The Court has 
(inadvertently it seems) sapped the marketplace of state experimentation and has 
preempted Congress’ exclusive power to define what the market should be.  The 
Supreme Court is acting like the nation’s economist-in-chief, and nothing in the 
text of the Constitution gives it the power to do so.  Congress has that power and 
responsibility, except in the rarest of cases that compel judicial action.  The power 
to “regulate commerce among the States” belongs, after all, to Congress.
So that’s where I see us ending up.  The Court has taken us on a 
misconceived and constitutionally erroneous mission in the name of federalism 
and sovereignty.  It should stop spinning high theories of “federalism” and 
“sovereignty” that the Constitution does not create.  It should return to enforcing 
the obstacles set out in the Constitution; to assuring the integrity of the structural 
processes for exercise of federal power; and making the competing interests—the 
States and Congress—count to ten and give sober second thought when an 
obstacle is approached.  Doing so will be more than enough to keep the Court 
plenty busy.
201 See, e.g.,Younger, 401 U.S. at 37; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Steffel v. Thompson, 
415 U.S. 452 (1974); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
202 See, e.g., Middlesex Co. Ethics Committee v. Garden St. Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423 (1982); 
Penzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
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Regards,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
Is the liberal view any more coherent than the conservative view?  No.  
One-directional constructs don’t tell us very much about how to interpret specific 
language in the Constitut ion.  And the moderate construct we’ve discussed, 
Justice Kennedy’s insistence on speaking in terms of divided sovereignty, it so 
vague that despite its essential accuracy, sometimes I think it provides less 
practical advice than the alternatives.  It’s not the Justices fault.  Federalism, 
sovereignty—it’s a slippery subject.  And in this area of the law, there is a 
temptation to lose oneself in the sort of philosophical reflection that leads to long, 
opaque essays.  Opaque essay-writing is a weakness from which I suffer as well.
I’m troubled by your praise for the abstention doctrines. I’ve never been 
the most enthusiastic fan of abstention—I never like to shut the federal courthouse 
doors, even temporarily. Your point, however, is well-taken.  The courts aren’t 
fora for philosophical reflection.  They’re places to resolve disputes.  And if we’re 
going to have two court systems with two bodies of law and separate spheres of 
jurisdiction and supremacy, then we’ve got to have some mechanism for 
commodiously moving cases from one system to the next, where each claim can 
be presented and adjudicated in its proper way.  
Perhaps this is the final lesson of our engaging exchange.  Divided 
sovereignty comes with its price.  The Constitution seems to ask us to accept that 
the federal legislature partakes of a bewildering duality; that this is part of the 
framers’ design; and that Congress will, in the long run, tend to get it right on 
most federalism issues.  The Bill of Rights charms us with its gripping political
principles.  No great creative mind is needed to see the First Amendment at work.  
The structural clauses of the Constitution, however, are works of artifice.  They 
are dry.  They are technical. They do not speak in poetry to the moral 
imagination. The clauses of the Constitution ask us for faith in its designs.  I like 
to think I carry the faith, but it is hard for me, as I know it is sometimes hard for 
all of us, to accept the short run.  And sometimes, and the Supreme Court is no 
exception to this rule, we strain to anticipate framers. I think that patience, in the 
end, is the constitutional virtue. 
Cheers,
S.M.
